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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, Major League Baseball (MLB) teams have increasingly drawn talent from the 
international market.  This study employs econometric techniques to test the various labor 
discrimination issues facing Japanese players playing in America’s MLB.  There have been 
remarkably few studies focusing on Japanese players in MLB.  Data from the 1995 to 2007 
season has been analyzed.  High degrees of discriminatory pay scales are found for Japanese 
pitchers.  The findings suggest that Japanese batters do not face such pay discrimination.  
Positional discrimination has also been the subject of investigation.  Japanese players are 
found to be disproportionally pitchers.  Suggestions for future research topics are presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper will investigate issues pertinent to the assimilation of Japanese baseball players in 
the United States’ Major League Baseball system.  In order to gain a more complete 
understanding of this issue, broad research has been conducted in the area of baseball’s 
historical place in Japanese history.  In Japan, “America’s” game thrives in its own right.  
This study includes passages detailing various aspects of baseball in Japan.  The fundamentals 
of Japanese baseball are introduced first.  Following this section, a brief historical context of 
baseball in Japan and an explanation of the posting system is provided.  Koshien, the annual 
high school tournament is also profiled.  Game play differences between Major League 
Baseball (MLB) and Japan’s Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) league will be interesting 
to even the most casual baseball spectator.  Several of baseball’s factual and hypothetical 
globalization efforts are also provided in the introductory pages of this study.   
The main purpose of this study is to investigate the issue of discrimination, using econometric 
analysis, regarding Japanese baseball players playing in America’s Major League Baseball.  
Of this topic, salary discrimination will be the main focus.  Various econometric and 
statistical devices, including linear regression, the Chow Test, “bootstrapping”, random 
sampling, and Oaxaca decomposition will be utilized in order to best reveal the true nature of 
labor market discrimination towards Japanese-born players in Major League Baseball.  
Positional segregation as well as salary discrimination will be investigated.  Demographic 
influences and inclusive team performance have also been analyzed, albeit to a lesser extent.  
The following is a list of specific questions that this study attempts to addresses: 
1. What are the best salary predictors for Japanese-born players playing in the United 
States and do these differ from non-Japanese players? 
2. Does the average salary level of equally talented players1 differ between Japanese 
and Non-Japanese? 
3. Do returns-to-experience2 in MLB differ between Japanese and Non-Japanese? 
4. Do Japanese-born players playing in the United States face positional 
discrimination? 
                                                 
1
 For both batters and pitchers 
2
 For both batters and pitchers 
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5. Do Japanese-born players playing in the United States face customer 
discrimination? 
6. Do inclusive teams3 perform better4 than their homogeneous counterparts? 
7. What are the characteristics of inclusive teams5 and do they differ from their 
homogeneous counterparts? 
                                                 
3
 With respect to Japanese born players 
4
 In terms of team wins 
5
 With respect to Japanese born players 
Please note: “Call-out” boxes like 
this one have been utilized in an 
effort to help bring attention to the 
main conclusions of this study; 
look for them throughout.  
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FUNDAMENTALS OF JAPANESE BASEBALL 
In order to obtain a solid foundation of background knowledge concerning the history of 
Japanese-MLB relations, five texts were read in preparing to write this paper.  The first 
section of this paper represents a summary of said works.  The content of the books varied 
from historical overviews of baseball in Japan, to modern Japanese players and their transition 
to America’s Major League Baseball system, to the globalization of the sport of baseball. 
The first book I read was Baseball Samurais: Ichiro Suzuki and the Asian Invasion by Ron 
Rains.  This book, although slightly outdated (copyright date 2001), provides solid 
introductory information concerning the influx of Japanese professional baseball players in 
the United States.  The book commences with a very brief historical overview of baseball in 
Japan.  Following this introduction, Rains discusses the first few Japanese players’ transition 
from Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) in Japan to the Major Leagues in America.  Rains 
focuses his attention on Masanori Murakami, Hideo Nomo, Kazuhiro Sasaki, Hideki Irabu, 
and Ichiro Suzuki among some other future prospects.  The purpose of this study is not to 
focus on certain individual player’s transitions from Japan’s Nippon Professional Baseball to 
Major League Baseball.  However, learning of the different paths each player took to the 
MLB, each with his own obstacles, proved fundamental to researching the history of relations 
between NPB and MLB. 
Next, I read a book entitled You Gotta Have Wa, written by Robert Whiting.  Robert Whiting 
is an American journalist who resides in Tokyo, having penned several works regarding 
Japan’s Nippon Professional Baseball league.  Arguably Whiting’s most famous book, You 
Gotta Have Wa discusses in much detail some of the main differences between professional 
baseball in Japan and professional baseball in America.  There are several differences, both on 
the field and off.  These differences will be highlighted in a subsequent section of this paper.   
Another book written by Whiting, entitled The Meaning of Ichiro, was read next.  Admittedly 
there was much overlap between Whiting’s two books.  The more recent installment included 
topical information and stories on the latest Japanese and American baseball interactions.  The 
updated storylines focused namely on Ichiro Suzuki, Alfonso Soriano, Hideki Matsui and 
Bobby Valentine. 
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The fourth book I read was Baseball without Borders: The International Pastime, edited by 
George Gmelch.  Gmelch organizes sixteen essays detailing baseball’s presence in various 
nations around the globe.  The essays are organized by region—Asia, The Americas, Europe, 
and The Pacific.  The section on baseball in Asia is clearly the most relevant for my paper.  
However, the remaining essays provided good information on baseball’s development in the 
outstanding sections of the globe.   
The last book read in my quest to acquire a solid background context was a very interesting 
book written by Alan M. Klein.  In his book, entitled Growing the Game: The Globalization 
of Major League Baseball, Klein conducts several case studies related to the continuing 
internationalization of the game of baseball.  A typical MLB small-market (in this case the 
Kansas City Royals) team’s efforts to acquire international talent is juxtaposed with that of a 
typical MLB large-market (here the Los Angeles Dodgers) team’s.  Continuing, Klein writes 
of the Major League academies as well as “buscones” (local agents, oftentimes corrupt) so 
prevalent in the Dominican Republic baseball scene.  Chapters focusing on Japanese, 
European, and South African baseball are also included.  Finally, Klein examines Major 
League Baseball’s past, present, and future efforts in internationalizing its game. 
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BRIEF HISTORY OF BASEBALL IN JAPAN 
An American Professor teaching in Tokyo, Horace Wilson, introduced the Japanese people to 
the game of baseball in 1872 (Solloway, 2007).  Albert Bates and Hiroshi Hiraoka are 
credited for creating the first organized game in 1873 and team in 1883, respectively (Rains, 
2001).  A national high school tournament started in 1915; this tournament is known as 
“koshien” and is detailed in a subsequent section of this paper.  By 1936, a professional 
league, called Nippon Professional Baseball, was created (Rains, 2001).   
Opposing the United States in the Second World War, the Japanese created new words for 
things such as “base” “strike” and “pitch” because previously the English words were used 
(Rains, 2001).  After the Second World War, Allied troops and officials encouraged baseball 
to be played, both for recreation and as a way for the Japanese and Allied troops to interact 
(Rains, 2001).  The growth of baseball in Japan quickened after the war and by the 1950’s, 
there were two leagues in Nippon Professional Baseball, the Central and Pacific. 
Both before and after the Second World War, American teams made several tours playing 
baseball against local Japanese teams throughout the nation.  In addition to these touring trips, 
Major League teams invited Japanese players to play with them during spring training.  This 
was a mutually beneficial situation as the Japanese players could use their time in America to 
fine-tune their skills, while the American teams could explore the Japanese’s talent level.   In 
1964 Masanori Murakami played in the farm system of the San Francisco Giants.  He played 
so well, that the Giants desired to have Murakami play the 1965 season with the Major 
League club.  This set off a large dispute between the two nation’s leagues.   
The Japanese club believed they had the rights to Murakami, however, according to the 
contract they had with the Giants, those rights were forgone if the Giants paid $10,000 (Rains, 
2001).  In the end, an agreement allowed the Giants to retain Murakami in 1965; after the 
season Murakami would be free to decide where he wanted to play.  Murakami pitched very 
well for the Giants, but because of intense pressure politically and socially, he decided to 
return to Japan in 1966.  No other Japanese players would come to play in America until 
Hideo Nomo in 1995. 
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The “modern” (ie. from 1995 to present) influx of Japanese-born players in Major League 
Baseball began when Hideo Nomo signed with the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1995.  The story 
of how Nomo came to play in America necessitates some explanation.  At the time, Nomo 
was pitching well in Japan, earning $1.5 million per year.  Nomo’s competitive nature drove 
him to bring his pitching to the highest level of play, the United States’ Major Leagues.  
However, Japanese rules stated that a player had to be a ten-year veteran before becoming a 
free agent.  To evade this rule, Nomo’s agents advised him to announce his “retirement”—
therefore becoming a free agent (Rains, 2001).  After announcing his “retirement” in Japan, 
Nomo was free to negotiate contracts with Major League clubs in America.   
The contractual loophole exposed by Don Nomura and Hideo Nomo was subsequently closed.  
A clever system termed “posting” has been developed to facilitate the movement of players 
from Japan’s Nippon Professional Baseball to Major League Baseball.  A delineated 
description of this system is provided below. 
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POSTING SYSTEM 
Due to Hideo Nomo’s clever actions in evading the Japanese free agency rules, the NPB 
quickly modified them.  Under the new system, players in Japan become free agents after nine 
years of tenure.  If a team anticipates a star player wishes to declare free agency as soon as 
eligible, the team will utilize the “posting” system.  The posting system allows a team to 
receive some compensation for a player that they would otherwise not receive.  This system 
has received much attention in the Northeast with the coming of such players as Hideki 
Matsui and Daisuke Matsuzaka; however, further explanation will be provided. 
In the posting system, Major League organizations are given a time period to provide sealed 
bids for the opportunity to negotiate with a Japanese player.  The Japanese player is someone 
who would otherwise not be a free agent, but the player’s Japanese club realizes the player 
intends to leave the team soon (as soon as he becomes free agent eligible).  This allows a 
cash-strapped Japanese team to get something in return for the talent they have helped 
develop from a youth to a talented star. 
Sealed bids are submitted by any interested MLB club.  Bids must be submitted within four 
days of a player being posted.  The club with the highest bid possesses the sole negotiation 
rights with the player for a certain length of time.  If the Major League club signs the player, 
they have to pay the Japanese club the bid submitted earlier.  If an agreement between the 
Japanese player and American team cannot be reached, the player continues to play for the 
Japanese team and the American team pays nothing to the Japanese team.  The posting system 
is very unique and interesting.  Some critics accuse the posting system of being in violation of 
U.S. antitrust law as well as an infringement of basic human rights (Whiting, 2004).  Indeed, 
an entire thesis could be written on the posting system; but that is not the purpose of this 
paper.  However, it is important to understand the basics of the posting system as part of the 
basic relations between NPB and MLB. 
The first positional player to come from Japan and play in the Major Leagues was Ichiro 
Suzuki.  Ichiro went through the posting system in 2000, as his Japanese club, the Orix Blue 
Wave, knew of his intentions to sign in America as soon as becoming free-agent eligible 
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(Rains, 2001).  The Seattle Mariners won the rights to negotiate with Ichiro with a sealed bid 
of $13.125 million (Rains, 2001).  At the time, Seattle already had a prominent Japanese 
player on their roster in pitcher Kazuhiro Sasaki.  Having a fellow countryman on his team 
may have been reason enough for Ichiro to sign with the Mariners (the 3-year, $14 million 
deal may have helped as well).  Clearly the Mariners, owned by Japanese videogame 
company Nintendo, have a high interest in Japanese players.  
 
Why The Posting System Hurts Small-Market Teams 
 
The player market in Japan is well developed and mature.  The level of play in Japan is high, 
to such a degree that exhibition tours of American teams foster stiff competition.  Because of 
the high level of play and wide media coverage received by Japanese teams, players’ talents 
can be thoroughly evaluated by MLB scouts.  The posting system inherently hurts teams with 
less money to spend on player contracts.  Allard Baird, former General Manager (GM) of the 
Kansas City Royals (the archetypical small-market MLB club) described the penny-pinching 
ways of small market clubs as: “Going shopping without a credit card” (Klein, 2006).  The 
posting system essentially aides teams that can afford to pay large player contracts.  The 
posting system is a silent auction!  Therefore, small-market teams cannot afford to sign 
Japanese talent via the posting system because large-pocketed clubs [i.e. - New York 
(Yankees and Mets), Boston, Los Angeles (Angels and Dodgers)] will routinely outbid them.  
Small-market teams cannot afford to gamble on a proven Japanese star—if the expensive 
player flops in America, most of the teams’ salary expenditures are wasted. 
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KŌSHIEN 
In Japan, an annual national baseball tournament of high school teams occurs each August.  
The tournament, held at Kōshien, is the most-watched high school sporting event in the world 
(Gmelch, 2006).  A stellar performance at the tournament, which is viewed by millions on 
television and in person, can catapult a player to the status of a national hero.  Only the best 
high school teams make it the coveted tournament; many players in the Nippon Professional 
Baseball league had the honor of participating during their youth.  Dramatic games filled with 
emotion are the norm at this exciting event.  America’s nationally televised and dramatic 
Little League tournament in Williamsport, Pennslyvania pales in comparison.  The pressroom 
contains nearly eighty reporters, from all of the nation’s major newspapers (Gmelch, 2006).  
Once making it to the tournament, coaches frequently overextend (by American standards) 
their players, especially the pitching aces.  A story that epitomizes this overextension involves 
current star for the Boston Red Sox, Daisuke Matsuzaka.  In 1998, “Dice-K” pitched all 
seventeen innings (250 pitches) of an extra innings game one day, nine innings the following 
day, and threw a no-hitter in the tournament finals.  While not on the hill (an infrequent 
occurrence indeed), Matsuzaka was kept busy by patrolling the outfield (Gmelch, 2006). 
Baseball’s popularity among Japan’s youth population has recently seen a decline.  Perhaps 
the creation of a Japanese professional soccer league and the corporal punishment and rigid 
training requirements of many youth baseball teams can account for the declining popularity 
of baseball among Japan’s youth.  A committee, the Looking Forward to the 21st Century 
Committee, was created during the mid 1990’s to examine how to improve the popularity of 
baseball in Japan.  It was suggested that coaches stress the enjoyment of the game, and reduce 
the rigid and discipline training requirements inherent in Japanese baseball.  However, the 
Japanese system has largely been slow in adopting the suggestions (Gmelch, 2006).  
However, baseball’s popularity is increasing as players like Ichiro Suzuki and Hideki Matsui 
flourish in the major leagues. 
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GAME-PLAY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 
 
The similarities between American Major League Baseball and Japanese Nippon Professional 
Baseball all but end after the fact that there are nine players on the field at a time.  Perhaps 
this is an overstatement, but the cultural and on-the-field differences are striking.  Please note: 
the vast majority of these differences have been revealed by Robert Whiting in his two books 
on the subject You Gotta Have Wa and The Meaning of Ichiro. 
• Japanese professional teams are owned by large corporations (media 
conglomerates, railroad companies, large retailers etc.) mostly as public relations 
vehicles.  It is not uncommon for Japanese teams to earn negative profits as they 
are frequently run by a businessman with little baseball knowledge. 
• Japanese teams play a 130 game season, as opposed to MLB’s 162.  Because of 
the rainy season each summer, many games are postponed until the end of the 
season. 
• Ties are allowed.  In the Pacific League, no new innings may be started after four 
hours or twelve innings of play.  In the Central League, a game lasting fifteen 
innings results in a tie. 
• The Japanese farm system (player development) is much less developed than the 
system in America.  There are only twelve minor league teams.  Each professional 
club has one affiliated minor league team that plays only eighty games per season. 
• The Japanese baseball is slightly smaller than the American version while the 
Japanese strike zone is slightly larger. 
• On the whole, Japanese field dimensions are smaller than American ballparks’. 
• Team aspects, the sacrifice bunt, the squeeze play and the hit-and-run are used 
much more in Japanese baseball than in American.  In 2003, Tokyo Giants 
infielder Masahiro Kawai set the record for career sacrifice bunts with 514. 
• Practice 
• Spring training in Japan begins in mid-January, in the bitter cold of winter.  
Practices are seven hours long, consist of ten miles of running and are followed by 
evening strategy sessions with coaches in the team dormitory.  This stands in 
marked contrast to American spring training which begins in March, lasts five or 
six weeks, and consists of three to four hours practicing per day. 
• Japanese teams conduct difficult training nearly every day during the regular 
season, even on afternoon game days and getaway travel days.  This is certainly 
not the case in America, where in the heat of summer, many players do not even 
take on-field pregame batting practice. 
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• The “1000 Fungo Drill” – players are forced to field batted balls hit slightly out of 
their reach to their sides or rear until they collapse from exhaustion. 
• In Japan, a quota is in place on how many foreign players are allowed on each 
team.  The quota has varied but currently stands at four foreigners per team (with 
no more than three position players or three pitchers).  One Asian player (from one 
of the leagues in China, Korea, or Taiwan) may be excluded from the foreigner 
limit.  
• In general, the salary level in Japanese baseball is lower than in Major League 
Baseball.  To attract former Major Leaguers, gaijins (“foreigners”) are paid a 
higher salary level (two to three times what comparable Japanese players make) 
and treated to such luxuries as free cars, and living and travel accommodations not 
offered to local players. 
• In Japan, a player is deemed a free agent after nine years of service; in America, 
six years gets a player to free agency. 
• Japanese players are on average much more discipline at the plate than their 
American counterparts.  Take this example—Ichiro Suzuki never struck out 
swinging during his entire high school career (536 at bats)! 
• The Japanese player’s union is much less forceful than Major League Baseball’s 
player’s union.  In fact, the players have never struck in Japanese baseball history 
whereas there have been several work stoppages in the history of MLB. 
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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 
There is no denying the increasing internationalization of Major League Baseball.  The 
international growth of the game is remarkable.  Take this striking example—only two of the 
nine Florida Marlins starters in the final game of the 2003 World Series were American 
citizens (Whiting, 2004).  The growth of the game has faced obstacles, namely underfunding 
in some nations, namely South Africa and Europe, as well the International Olympic 
Committee’s decision to remove baseball (and softball) from the summer Olympiad’s lineup 
beginning with the London games in 2012.  Baseball may be reinstated by the committee for 
action in the 2012 games, that prospect seems unlikely.  Major developments in the 
internationalization of baseball have taken the form of a FIFA (Fédération Internationale de 
Football Association) style world-cup, called the “World Baseball Classic”, in addition to the 
continued relations between Major League Baseball and Nippon Professional Baseball—
taking the form of tours, demonstrations, exhibition, preseason, and opening day games being 
played in and around Japan. 
World Baseball Classic 
 
In the fall of 2001, Bud Selig, MLB Commissioner, first publicly announced his intentions for 
a world-cup style international baseball tournament.  In stark contrast to FIFA’s 
organizational structure where the tournament is ruled by a board with representatives from 
competing countries, the WBC is a Major League Baseball International (MLBI) run 
invitational tournament.  This structure caused some uproar from baseball powerhouses Korea 
and Japan.  After some negotiations, the tournament was able to be played with all major 
baseball-playing nations in March of 2006.  The revenue sharing process of the inaugural 
WBC was as follows: the costs to run the tournament will be skimmed off the top.  After 
paying all costs, the national federations from each country would divide 53% of the 
remaining revenue along the following lines: MLB 17.5%, MLBPA 17.5%, all other 
professional leagues 13%, and International Baseball Federation 5%.  The other 47% of 
revenue remaining would be allocated as prize money (Klein, 2006).  Klein is quick to point 
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out that on a team basis (30 in MLB while only 12 in NPB) the revenue sharing plan is quite 
fair. 
It should be noted that Japan was given two seats on the WBC steering committee in an effort 
to improve the tournament and relations between MLBI and NPB.  The next WBC will 
commence on March 5, 2009, with the winning team crowned champion on March 23, 2009.  
Venues include Tokyo, Mexico City, Toronto, San Juan, San Diego, Miami, and Los Angeles.  
Again, a 16-team format is being employed with the same nations scheduled to return 
(although initial pools have been slightly altered from the first WBC).  MLBI has shifted the 
tournament from round-robin pool play to double-elimination pool play.  This modification 
was undertaken in order to avoid awkward tie-breaking procedures in-place during the first 
tournament. 
The WBC is scheduled to occur every four years (although, only three years elapsed between 
the inaugural tournament and the second occurrence of the WBC).  This scheduling appears to 
mesh nicely with the schedules of other major international events—Summer Olympics will 
occur one year before the WBC, Winter Olympics will occur one year after the WBC, and the 
FIFA World Cup (men’s tournament) will occur one year after the WBC. 
MLB-NPB Merger 
 
Currently a MLB-NPB merger seems quite unrealistic due to cultural, business, and logistical 
reasons.  However, the situation has been occasionally mentioned and pondered.  According 
to Whiting, a Japanese division could be formed and included in the American and or 
National League.  Due to extremely long flight times as well as visa issues, a potential merger 
between MLB and NPB is highly unlikely (Whiting, 2004). 
Asian League 
 
Perhaps an Asian League, consisting of teams from the professional leagues in South Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan may be formed.  The winner of the Asian League could then perhaps be 
invited to participate in the MLB postseason as a wildcard team (Whiting, 2004).  Alan Klein 
also offers a suggestion of how to realign MLB on a global scale.  Klein suggests creating a 
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“Pacific Rim” division consisting of most current MLB west coast teams and teams from 
Tokyo, Seoul, Taiwan and Sidney.  Continuing on that structure, a “Pan-American” division 
consisting of teams from Florida, Tampa Bay, Texas, Houston, Arizona, Havana, Monterrey, 
and Caracas could be developed (Klein, 2006).  Currently, this realignment seems far-fetched 
at best, however, it remains a very intriguing way of creating an actual “world” champion. 
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INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMETRIC STUDY 
Many people believe that the sporting industry represents a true “melting pot” of diverse 
people and culture.  The motivations of winning, both the pride of winning in amateur sports 
and the financial incentives in professional sports, are thought to rid the sporting world of any 
labor discrimination.  Because of their popular appeal, sports often become the focus of 
scholarly research.  Many research endeavors have focused on evaluating the degree of labor 
discrimination within various professional sports, towards a variety of ethnic and racial 
groups.  In my review of the literature, I surveyed many of these articles.  I have chosen the 
issue of labor discrimination surrounding Japanese players playing in America’s Major 
League Baseball as the topic of my research. 
The vast majority of labor discrimination research in professional baseball concerns itself 
with investigating the integration of African-Americans in Major League Baseball since 
Jackie Robinson first broke the color barrier in 1947.  In addition, a small portion of the 
literature concerns itself with the issue of labor discrimination of Hispanic-born players in 
Major League Baseball.  The specific issue of labor discrimination of Japanese-born baseball 
players in the United States’ Major League Baseball (MLB) has gone largely unresearched.  
In some studies, players of Asian descent were even excluded on the basis of their being too 
small a sample size. 
Horace Wilson introduced the Japanese people to the game of baseball in 1872 (Solloway, 
2007) and yet, over the 135 years that have since passed, a mere thirty-four Japanese players 
have come to play in Major League Baseball.  With baseball’s strong popularity in Japan and 
a 2007 population base of over 127 million people (Japan, 2008), why has the number of 
Japanese players to come to America been so insignificant?  Relations between Japan’s 
Nippon Professional Baseball (NPB) League and America’s Major League Baseball (MLB), 
as well as cultural differences between Japanese and American people may perhaps begin to 
answer a portion of this question.  The issue of labor discrimination also indeed presents 
itself.  Relevant questions that come to mind include: 
• Have fewer Japanese-born players come to play in American Major League 
Baseball because they have faced labor discrimination or have fewer Japanese-
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born players come to play in American Major League Baseball because of other 
reasons? 
• Is the recent surge of Japanese players coming to America due to the weakening of 
labor discrimination or has the surge been caused by other reasons? 
• What fielding positions have Japanese players in Major League Baseball 
traditionally played and why has this been the case? 
This study will employ econometric regression analysis to best attempt to answer these and 
other relevant questions concerning Japanese integration in Major League Baseball 
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LITERATURE REVIEW – ECONOMETRIC STUDY 
Gerald Scully’s 1974 pioneering article, Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball, has 
been heralded as one of the first significant articles examining salary determinants in 
professional sports.  As the title of his work indicates, Scully focused his attention on Major 
League Baseball.  Using data from the 1968 and 1969 MLB seasons, Scully estimated salary 
functions and marginal revenue products of the factors of production; he then found the rates 
of monopolistic exploitation by comparing salary and marginal revenue product over various 
performance levels and career lengths (Scully, 1974).   
The most important part of this study, as it applies to my examination of discrimination 
towards Japanese players in Major League Baseball, resides in Scully’s salary regression 
equation’s specification.  Scully attributes four main factors responsible for determining 
baseball players’ salaries in Major League Baseball—hitting/pitching performance; the weight 
of the players’ contributions to team performance; the number of years spent in the majors; 
and the greater bargaining power of “superstar” players (Scully, 1974).  Scully ran two 
regressions, one for batters and one for pitchers.   
For the batters equation, salary was regressed as the dependent variable with lifetime slugging 
percentage,6 the weight of a hitter’s contribution to team performance, experience (measured 
as years of Major League experience), and variables accounting for the size of team market, 
intensity of fan interest and membership in the then-superior National League, as the 
independent variables.7   
The pitchers’ regression again regressed salary as the dependent variable.  The independent 
variables used were: the lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio, lifetime average percentage of 
innings pitched out of total innings, experience (measured as years of Major League 
experience), size of team market, intensity of fan interest and a dummy variable for 
                                                 
6
 To include the more popular batting average statistic, Scully included a dummy variable if a player had above 
average batting average and a lesser than average slugging percentage. 
7
 The log (base 10) of each variable was used in the regression equation and all performance measures were 
lagged one year to reflect the contractual nature of baseball contracts. 
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membership in the then-superior National League.  Once again, performance measures were 
lagged and logs for all variables were used. 
Scully’s batters’ equation accounted for 81% (R-squared=0.81) of the variation in players’ 
salaries; the pitchers’ equation accounted for 78% (R-squared=0.78) of the variation in 
players’ salaries.  The performance variables were all found to be significant at the 10% level 
with all but one significant at 1% significance or better.  These high R-squared values and 
significant variables indicate that Scully’s regression was well specified econometrically.  The 
variables accounting for team market size, fan intensity and membership in the National 
League were all interestingly found insignificant.  Overall, Scully’s work confirmed the 
concept that ballplayer salaries are related to performance (Scully, 1974). 
Using data from the 1976 season, Hill and Spellman investigated labor discrimination in 
Major League Baseball.  Their study was conducted in a similar way to Scully’s.  Using both 
linear and logarithmic formats, only small wage differentials between black and white players 
were found to be attributable to discrimination (Hill & Spellman, 1984).  Included as 
independent variables in the batters’ specification were runs scored per year and years of 
major league experience.  For pitchers, career earned run average, career innings pitched per 
year and years of major league experience were included as independent variables.  Rookies 
were dropped from the regression.  Hill and Spellman used both a log-linear and log-log 
specification and found the log-log specifications to have a higher R-squared values in most 
cases. 
Lawrence M. Kahn’s summary of all substantial previous research concerning labor 
discrimination in professional sports, published in his 1991 article in Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, possesses tremendous value.  In this survey of the literature, Kahn 
conducts a “study of studies” presenting the previously discovered findings (from Pascal and 
Rapping in 1972 to Kahn in 1989) from the scholarly community up through the late 1980’s.  
In general, Kahn disseminates labor discrimination into three broad categorical forms—
unequal pay for equal work, unequal hiring standards, and positional segregation.   To a large 
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extent, these three forms of labor discrimination, modeled specifically towards the issue of 
Japanese players in Major League Baseball, sparked my curiosity and prompted this study.   
Let me focus on previous studies relating to Kahn’s first form of labor discrimination, unequal 
pay for equal work.  Most of the previous scholarly research has been conducted in a 
generally similar way.8  This method can be described as regressing workers’ salaries (or the 
natural log of workers’ salary) as the dependent variable, and using varying measures of 
productivity as the independent variables.  To examine the issue of discrimination, a dummy 
variable, or several if examining several races, (e.g. - White, African-American, Hispanic, 
Asian decent, etc.) is also included as an independent variable in the regression equation.  The 
coefficient of the dummy variable, and its significance (or lack of significance) indicates the 
degree of discrimination (or labor equality) towards that race or group of people.  Before 
including a dummy variable, separate regressions would be run for each group.  Scholars then 
conduct a Chow test9 to evaluate the difference in the two (or more) equations’ estimated 
coefficients.  If the Chow test provided evidence that the separate regressions’ coefficients do 
not differ significantly, the various race observations were allowed to be pooled together and 
further analysis would be conducted.     
Kahn’s 1991 examination of previous “unequal pay for equal work” studies included a total of 
twenty-four prior studies; of these, twelve specifically inspect discrimination in professional 
baseball.  These studies, and others published since Kahn’s summary, will be the focus of my 
research; they are varied, including research on different groups of players such as free agents 
and non-free agent, as well as infielders, outfielders, and pitchers.  The majority of the studies 
focus solely on black (or nonwhite) versus white discrimination (eg. Scully, Mogull, Medoff, 
Moguli, Cymrot, Raimondo, Hill and Spellman, Christiano) while a few others include 
Hispanic and/or Latino (Pascal and Rapping, Kahn) discrimination.   Some of the studies 
examine returns to performance across races, while others examine returns to experience. 
                                                 
8
 Similar to that of Gerald W. Scully, and Hill and Spellman, discussed in detail above. 
9
 The Chow Test is an econometric analytical tool named for its inventor, Gregory Chow.  This test is a 
specialized version of the F test. 
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The results of these studies cannot be summarized in one or two sentences.  To a large degree, 
the conclusions drawn from the studies contradict one another.  A significant amount of the 
findings indicate a presence of salary discrimination in baseball while at the same time a 
significant amount of the findings report just the opposite.  In an updated article in 2000, 
Kahn indicates that “…regression analysis of salaries in baseball…have not found much 
evidence of racial salary discrimination against minorities” (Kahn, 2000). 
These differences can possibly be explained by the fact that the scholars employed differing 
statistical and econometrical analysis tools in their research—some used Chow tests, some 
two-tailed significance tests, some one-tailed significance tests, some no significance tests, 
etc.  In addition, the use of different era and player datasets perhaps sheds light on why the 
conclusions between scholars differ to the extent that they do.  The largest sample used in any 
of the studies was only 885 players while the smallest sample used consists of a mere 54 
players.  Perhaps more concrete conclusions can be drawn by increasing the sample size 
employed in this type of research.   
The decision of which performance measures best indicate a player’s performance and thus 
are most important to include in the regression as independent variables can be a heated 
debate topic.  Many early researchers make the common mistake of including too many 
independent variables.  If utilized, this “everything-but-the-kitchen-sink” mentality will 
produce an estimated regression equation with little value.  I will examine traditional 
performance measures as well as contemporary research in sabermetrics, in order to determine 
which variables to utilize in my study. 
The study of statistics in professional sports, specifically in baseball, has grown tremendously 
with the advent of computer technologies, rotisserie fantasy sport leagues, and the Internet 
(Luttrell, 1999).  Statistical guru and lifetime baseball fan Bill James has been recognized as 
the pioneer of the “sabermetrics” movement.  Loosely speaking, sabermetrics can be thought 
of as the use of extensive statistics in empirically quantifying new and old ideas in baseball 
thinking.  James coined the terminology sabermetrics, after the Society for American Baseball 
Research or SABR (Ackman, 2007). 
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Oakland Athletics’ front office, led by General Manager Billy Beane, and portrayed in 
Michael L. Lewis’ best-seller, Moneyball, employs several new methodologies that challenge 
many of baseball’s traditional thinkers.  In general, this new way of thinking emphasizes 
generating runs for batters10 and preventing runs for pitchers and defense, as opposed to many 
of the traditional statistical measurements that blatantly disregard these objectives11 
(McGrath, 2003). 
Some of the most traditionally referenced measures of performance for pitchers are Wins (W), 
Loses (L), Games (G), Games Started (GS), Strikeouts (K), Saves (SV), Hits (H), Earned 
Runs (ER), Home Runs (HR), Walks (BB), Intentional Walks (IBB), Wild Pitches (WP), Hit 
by Pitch (HBP), Balks (BK), Batters Faced by Pitcher (BFP), Games Finished (GF) and Runs 
(R).  In popular culture, these statistics gain much esteem; however, in recent years these 
statistics’ ability to reflect truly on pitcher performance has been questioned by those from the 
sabermetric school of thought.  Most pitching statistic measures are (at least somewhat, and 
some much more so than others) team dependent, and thus they fail to truly reflect the 
individual ability of the pitcher.  To solve this problem, a new category of pitching statistics 
attempt to remove any teammate dependency and therefore better reflect the pitcher’s ability.  
These statistics fall under the terminology “defensive independent pitching statistics” or DIPS 
(McCracken, 2001). 
For batters, the traditional statistical categories have been: Games (G), At-Bats (AB), Runs 
(R), Hits (H), Doubles (2B), Triples (3B), Homeruns (HR), Batting Average (AVG), Runs 
Batted In (RBI), Runs Scored (RS), Stolen Bases (SB), Caught Stealing (CS), Walks (BB), 
Strikeouts (K), Intentional Walks (IBB), Hit by Pitch (HBP), Sacrifice Hits (SH), Sacrifice 
Fly (SF) and Ground into Double Plays (GIDP).  New waves of “sabermetric” statistical 
categories have been developed to better stress the importance of scoring runs.  These newer 
statistical categories include – Slugging Percentage (SLG), On-base Percentage (OBS), On-
Base plus Slugging (OPS), and Runs Created (RC).   
                                                 
10
 Examples: On-base percentage and slugging percentage. 
11
 Examples: Batting average and stolen bases. 
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It is important to avoid severe multicollinearity as well as omitted variable bias.  For these 
reasons, the choices of which performance measures to include, as well as which specification 
to select, are of vast importance.  Indeed, much of the work in developing a study such as this 
one lies in determining the variables to include and the specification to use.  Sound economic 
and sporting theory should always dictate these decisions. 
It is essential that the performance measures are measured and reported accurately in the 
datasets.  If there are errors or missing data in the data sets, the estimated regression equation 
will lose its accuracy and significance in depicting how the system truly operates.  As in any 
estimated regression equation the size of the sample dictates how much faith we can place in 
the output.  All else being equal, a larger sample size is preferred.  The earlier salary 
regression studies concerning labor discrimination in professional sports had smaller sample 
sizes than the more recently conducted studies (Kahn, 1991). 
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SALARY REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
I have attained my dataset for this study from Sean Lahman’s comprehensive collection of 
baseball statistical data available for free private-use online at http://www.baseball1.com.  
The database is available for download in both Microsoft Excel (CSV) and Microsoft Access 
(.mdb) format.  This dataset summarizes a widespread amount of statistics of professional 
baseball—everything from player biographical information, statistical performance, 
postseason performance, awards to salary information is included.  Much of this data is 
available for dates as far in the past as 1871! 
The database was modified in order to properly establish the correct relationships between the 
many tables of data within the database.  By establishing proper relationships within 
Microsoft Access, I was able to conduct many queries that provided the proper data when 
requested.  Further modification of the database was necessary; for my research purposes I 
aggregated player statistics for players with multiple “stints”12 or positions by year.  Much 
credit and appreciation is due to Bryant University Computer Information Systems Professor 
and Honors Program Coordinator, Dr. Kenneth J. Sousa, for his earnest assistance in this 
process of database management. 
In all instances, player data from 1995 to 2007 was used in the empirical research.  Data from 
years prior to 1994 was eliminated because only one Japanese player, Masanori Murakam in 
1964, had come to Major League Baseball prior to Hideo Nomo in 1995.  Separate 
regressions have been run for batters and pitchers.  Only batters with greater than or equal to 
300 At-Bats (ABs) qualified for use in this study.  Continuing, only data from pitchers with 
greater than or equal to 30 Innings-Pitched (IPs) were used in the pitchers’ salary regressions.   
Only players deemed to have some bargaining power in the salary process have been included 
in the regression specifications.  In Major League Baseball, the team that initially drafts a 
player has exclusive rights of him for three years.  After this three year period, the player may 
or may not be contractually bound by this same team for three additional years.  The rules of 
free agency are indeed quite convoluted and oftentimes each player’s individual situation will 
                                                 
12
 Trades between teams, call-ups / send-downs, in the same season 
Japanese Players in Major League Baseball:  An Econometric Analysis of Labor 
Discrimination 
Senior Capstone Project for Kyle Audet 
25 
 
vary depending on how much playing time at the major league level he has received in the 
first three years of his career (Kendrick).  The decision to include all players playing in at 
least their fourth year13 in the regression specifications was made.  It is very unlikely that a 
player would have 300 or more at-bats (for a batter) or pitch greater than 30  innings (for a 
pitcher) in a season, without possessing some form of salary negotiating rights (i.e.. 
arbitration). 
A review of the literature does not reveal any theoretical problems with running Chow Tests 
for small samples; but, there is reason to doubt the combining of data with such discrepancies 
in observation sizes14.  To make my findings more robust, I have run thirty additional 
regressions, ten for each of the three specifications. These additional regressions sampled 
10% and 20% of the non-Japanese batters.  Chow tests were then conducted on the additional 
regressions.  Only two of the Chow Tests indicated that it is incorrect to assume equal 
coefficients.  Thus, it appears that pooling the data and assuming equal coefficients is correct.  
For simplicity, this output has not been included in the Appendix; however, it may be 
furnished upon request15. 
The thirty MLB teams have been broken down into groups based on market size.  To this 
extent, I employed the consolidated statistical metropolitan areas, as depicted by Al Streit in 
an article published on http://www.baseball-almanac.com, to break the teams into Large, 
Medium and Small markets (with ten teams per category).  Finally, in order to fairly assess 
increasingly rising salary levels in MLB across several years, each player’s salary has been 
converted to year 2000 dollars using GDP deflator information available from the United 
States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) at http://www.bea.gov.  Summary statistics 
regarding the variables used throughout the study is presented both on the following page and 
in the appendix.
                                                 
13
 Note that all Japanese players were included because it is assumed that they have negotiating power when 
coming to play in Major League Baseball. 
14
 For batters, the dataset includes 3,061 Non-Japanese observations and 22 Japanese observations.  For pitchers, 
the dataset includes 2,471 Non-Japanese observations and 44 Japanese observations. 
15
 Such inquiries should be sent via email to kaudet22@yahoo.com.  
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Average Value - Batters Average Value - Pitchers 
Variable Description Japanese 
Non-
Japanese Combined Japanese 
Non-
Japanese Combined 
Observations 
 
                 
22  
                  
3,065             3,087  
                
44  
                  
2,471  
          
2,515  
        Age A player's age, in years. 31.31818 31.32822 31.32815 31.02273 30.8361 30.83936 
Age
2
 A player's age, in years, squared. 986.3182 992.7794 992.7334 972.0227 965.3962 965.5121 
Japan A dummy variable equal to 1 if the batter is Japanese. 1 0 0.0071267 1 0 0.017495 
JapanxAge An interaction variable equal to Japan*Age 31.31818 0 0.223194 31.02273 0 0.5427435 
ln(ABper) 
The natural log of the player's ratio of individual at-bats 
to team at-bats. -2.611814 -2.814013 -2.812572 
   
ln(sal) 
The natural log of the player's salary, lagged one year, 
converted to base year 2000 dollars using the GDP 
deflator. 14.99823 14.50726 14.51076 14.29548 14.38429 14.38274 
ln(SLG) The natural log of a player's slugging percentage. -0.8472776 -0.8639729 -0.8638537 
   lnIP The natural log of a player's total innings-pitched. 
   
4.70963 4.617302 4.618917 
lnSW The natural log of a player's strikeout to walk ratio. 
   
0.7335818 0.7393728 0.7392715 
RC_Bat 
The number of runs generated by a player, computed as 
(Slugging percentage)*(On-base percentage)*(At-bats). 72.4511 60.93429 61.01637 
   
Runs 
The number of runs generated by a player, computed as 
(0.41*singles)+(.82*doubles)+(1.06*triples)+(1.42*home 
runs). 80.70091 67.48931 67.58346 
   
Small 
A dummy variable, equal to one, if the player's team is 
in the bottom third of the league teams’ market sizes. 0.1818182 0.3187602 0.3177846 0.1136364 0.3269931 0.3232604 
SV_pitch A player's total number of saves in a season. 
   
4.681818 4.323756 4.33002 
W_pitch A player's total number of wins in a season. 
   
7.5 7.106839 7.113718 
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Batter Regressions 
I will run three sets of regressions for batter—one set will employ the traditional baseball 
thinking (ie. Scully), the second will use more modern sabermetric statistical theory while the 
third set of regressions will be conducted by combining the best aspects of the aforementioned 
as well as my own thoughts and theories.  Each set of regressions will have a Japanese, a non-
Japanese and a combination equation estimated—thus a total of nine regressions will be 
initially run.  Chow tests will then be performed to evaluate the degree to which the equations 
within each set differ.  If it is possible to pool the data, this will be done and further regression 
will be run using Oaxaca decomposition.  This process will allow quantitative evaluation of 
differences in salary level attributable between differences in characteristics (i.e. performance 
measures) and the differences attributable to other sources (i.e. discrimination).    
First I will supply reasoning and justification detailing the merit of each specification’s 
theory.  This justification will be followed by detailing the findings of each regression.  
Tables 1, 2 and 3 detail the results from the three regression specifications.  A summary table, 
combining these tables is also included.   
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Traditionalist Method Specification - Batters 
I will follow Scully’s methodology regarding the specification of the traditional baseball 
batter regression.  Following Scully’s lead, I will regress the natural log of player’s salaries16 
as the dependent variable with slugging percentage, contribution to team (calculated as 
individual at-bats divided by total team at-bats), and experience17 (proxied by age) as the 
independent variables.  In addition, I have added age squared to account for the diminishing 
property of returns to age in Major League Baseball.  In laymen’s terms, as a player gets 
older, he receives higher salaries, but only up to a certain point.  Eventually, if a player plays 
past his “prime”, he will begin to earn decreasing salary levels.  It is very important to lag the 
players’ salaries so that this year’s salary is aligned with last year’s performance.18  As 
mentioned earlier, only players with sufficient bargaining power were included in the 
regression analysis.   
Many previous studies used the log of the independent variables in their specifications.  This 
“log-log” specification provides for evaluating the effect of independent variable percentage 
changes with respect to the dependent variable (salary), in percentage terms.  I have selected a 
semi-log specification—taking the log of some variables while using the actual variable for 
others.  The natural logs of players’ salary, slugging percentage, and team contribution have 
been used; the players’ age has been measured simply in years. 
The specification of the equation is as follows:19 
ln	 
   	   ln  	     
The expected signs of the estimated coefficients were positive for each of the independent 
variables, except for the square of age.  It makes sense to believe that a baseball player’s 
                                                 
16
 (converted to base year 2000 dollars using the GDP deflator calculated from  Bureau of Economic Analysis 
data, http://www.bea.gov) 
17
 Age is preferred to MLB experience because of the tendency of Japanese players to develop their skills (for 
several seasons) in Japan’s NPB prior to coming to MLB 
18
 The downside of this lagging is a smaller sample size.  Eight Japanese players’ year’s statistics were dropped 
in order to lag their salaries. 
19
 Because Scully found fan intensity, market size and inclusion in the National League to be insignificant, I am 
excluding variables that would account for such factors.   
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salary will increase as he has a higher slugging percentage, more at-bats per team at-bats and 
gains seniority.  A series of three regressions were run, one for Japanese players, one for non-
Japanese players and one combining all batters.  Next a Chow Test was performed to evaluate 
if pooling the data were possible.  The regression output from STATA as well as the Chow 
Tests can be found in Appendix B.   
 
Table 1 - Traditional Method Specification - Batters 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant -33.059480 12.77249* 12.67581* 
 (-1.02) (13.68) (13.57) 
ln(Slugging Percentage) 2.885037 1.474381* 1.480376* 
 (1.69) (19.17) (19.28) 
ln(ABperteamAB) 0.7449075* 0.8940838* 0.8937928* 
 (2.37) (5.69) (33.94) 
Age 3.355589 0.3323444* 0.3391687* 
 (1.68) (5.69) (5.81) 
Age
2
 -0.053374 -0.0049254* -0.0050371* 
 (-1.74) (-5.44) (-5.56) 
R
2
 0.5485 0.4781 0.4776 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4423 0.4774 0.4769 
Number of Observations 22 3061 3083 
Chow Test 
Critical F value 2.21 
F Statistic 1.601375374 
Conclusion It is correct to assume equal coefficients. 
't' values in parentheses 
* Significant at the 5% level 
 
In the first regression run, of Japanese batters only, each of the independent variables’ signs 
was in the expected direction.  The signs of slugging percentage, at-bats per team at bats and 
age were positive, and the coefficient of the age squared variable was negative.   
The only variable deemed significant at the 5% level was the batters’ contribution to the team 
(AB/team AB).  However, slugging percentage, age and age squared were all significant at the 
11% level.   The specification’s theory is strong; this regression confirms this.  However, an 
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adjusted R-squared of 0.4423 is fairly low for such a small sample size.  In the future, with 
more observations, more robust specifications will be able to be produced. 
The regression of non-Japanese batters was very encouraging.  Again, all of the independent 
variables’ signs are in their expected direction.  Furthermore, each variable is significant at 
the 1% level.  The adjusted R-squared value for this regression was 0.4774.  This regression, 
with 3,061 observations has a better fit than the Japanese batters’ regression.   
The third regression, of all batters, was similar to that of non-Japanese batters.  All of the 
independent variables were in the expected direction and significant at the 1% level.  The 
adjusted R-squared value was 0.4769.  Scully was able to achieve much stronger levels of 
overall fit20 and thus it appears that this specification is not without faults.   
Finally, a Chow Test was conducted to determine 
the degree of difference between the constrained 
regression’s estimated coefficients.  An F statistic 
of approximately 1.61 was calculated.  This F-
value is less than the critical value of the F 
distribution (approximately 2.21).  We can 
conclude that it is correct to pool the data.  In 
terms of labor market discrimination, this 
conclusion supports the notion that the wage 
structure across Japanese and Non-Japanese batter populations is the same. 
  
                                                 
20
 Scully’s R-squared values ranged from 0.78 to 0.81. 
Traditional Method 
Specification - In terms of labor 
market discrimination, this 
conclusion supports the notion 
that the wage structure across 
Japanese and Non-Japanese 
batter populations is the same. 
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Sabermetric Method Specification - Batters 
In choosing the specification for the sabermetric regression equation, I focused on the 
performance measure of “Runs”.  Runs is a composite statistic developed and created by 
sabermetrician George Lindsey.  Essentially, the Runs statistic aims to capture the offensive 
production of a player or team, in terms of runs generated (Albert, 1999).  Bill James (as well 
as others) has developed more complicated formulas of the “Runs Created” statistic.  
However, in this specification, Lindsey’s simpler linear weight methodology has been utilized 
(see Appendix A for formula).  Lindsey developed the formula in the 1960s using baseball 
data and probability theory (Albert, 1999).   
  A semilog specification will be used in order to determine the unit increase effects of runs 
generated and the percentage change effect of age on the percentage change on salary, 
holding all other variables constant.  Because the runs statistic is thought to do a good job 
capturing a player’s offensive production, it will be the only performance measure included.  
Because of the importance of player experience in predicting salary, age and the square of age 
were also included in the sabermetric specification. 
The specification of the equation is as follows: 
ln	 
    	  	  	   
Both runs and age are thought to contribute positively to a batter’s salary.  However, the 
positive age effect is limited and thus, the variable for the square of age is thought to have a 
negative coefficient.  A series of three regressions were run, one for Japanese players, one for 
non-Japanese players and one combining all batters.  Next a Chow Test was performed to 
evaluate if pooling the data were possible.  The regression output from STATA as well as the 
Chow Tests can be found in Appendix B.   
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Table 2 - Sabermetric Method Specification - Batters 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant -46.795750 6.911381* 6.840096* 
 (-1.63) (7.96) (7.87) 
Runs 0.0151046* 0.0236116* 0.0235852* 
 (3.00) (61.56) (61.69) 
Age 3.857727* 0.351889* 0.3568111* 
 (2.16) (6.51) (6.60) 
Age
2
 -0.0610776* 0.0050582* -0.0051389* 
 (2.16) (-6.04) (-6.13) 
R
2
 0.5600 0.5538 0.5532 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4867 0.5534 0.5527 
Number of Observations 22 3065 3087 
Chow Test 
Critical F value 2.37 
F Statistic 1.83414466 
Conclusion It is correct to assume equal coefficients. 
 
't' values in parentheses 
* Significant at the 5% level 
 
The Japanese batter regression is quite promising as each explanatory variable’s coefficient is 
in the expected direction and significant at the 5% level.  However, the adjusted R-squared 
value is slightly low (for such a small sample) at 0.4867.  Again, with more observations this 
specification could be strengthened. 
The regression including all non-Japanese batters, with 3,065 observations, was much more 
robust in its specification.  The estimated coefficients of all explanatory variables are in the 
expected direction and significant at the 1% level.  The R-squared of this equation was 
significantly higher at 0.5534.  The sabermetric method of thinking regression including all 
batters was very similar to that of the non-Japanese players’ regression—both variables 
estimated coefficients positive and significant at the 1% level.  The R-squared value of this 
regression was 0.5527. 
Finally, a Chow Test was conducted to determine the degree of difference between the 
constrained regression’s estimated coefficients.  An F statistic of approximately 1.83 was 
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calculated.  This F-value is less than the critical value of the F distribution (approximately 
2.37) at the 5% level.  We can conclude that it is correct to pool the data. In terms of labor 
market discrimination, this conclusion supports the notion that the wage structure across 
Japanese and Non-Japanese batter populations is the same. 
  
Sabermetric Method Specification - In 
terms of labor market discrimination, 
this conclusion supports the notion that 
the wage structure across Japanese and 
Non-Japanese batter populations is the 
same. 
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Hybrid Method Specification - Batters 
After running the initial two specifications, the traditional and sabermetric, I sought to 
develop a superior specification.  The traditional and sabermetric batter’s regressions for 
Japanese players have very similar overall fits (adjusted R-squared values of 0.4423 and 
0.4867, respectively).  The same cannot be said for the traditional and sabermetric non-
Japanese batter regressions.  The sabermetric regression has a better overall fit, with an 
adjusted R-squared value of 0.5534 versus 0.4774 for the traditional method.  Thus, it appears 
that a sabermetric statistical category like “runs” has more explanatory value than a traditional 
metric like slugging percentage. 
In this new specification, I included a dummy variable to account for the vast spending 
differences of small-market MLB clubs.  Major League Baseball is different from other major 
sports’ leagues like the NBA, NFL and NHL in that no salary cap exists.  The luxury tax 
system attempts to even the playing field between large and small market clubs’ payroll.  A 
tax is levied on teams that have payroll in excess of the statutorily set limits ($136.5 million in 
2006) of the luxury tax system.  Nonetheless, as any MLB fan can attest, the large market 
teams consistently outspend the small market teams.   
Using Al Streit’s breakdown of MLB teams ranked according to the size of the consolidated 
statistical metropolitan areas, I divided the thirty teams into three categories: Small, Medium, 
Large.   
Large Medium Small
Baltimore Orioles Arizona Diamondbacks Cincinnati Reds
Chicago Cubs Atlanta Braves Cleveland Indians
Chicago White Sox Boston Red Sox Colorado Rockies
Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim Detroit Tigers Florida Marlins
Los Angeles Dodgers Houston Astros Milwaukee Brewers
New York Mets Kansas City Royals Minnesota Twins
New York Yankees Philadelphia Phillies Pittsburgh Pirates
Oakland Athletics Seattle Mariners San Diego Padres
San Francisco Giants Texas Rangers St. Louis Cardinals
Washington Nationals Toronto Blue Jays Tampa Bay Rays
 
This is not the perfect breakdown—being located in a large market does not necessarily mean 
that a club will have an elevated payroll (ie. Oakland Athletics).  In general, it can be said that 
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teams in the smallest markets have the lowest payrolls.  The average salary for a player in the 
“Small” category is $2,934,577 compared to an average salary of $3,723,200 for a player in 
the “Large” category.  It is therefore expected that the coefficient of the Small variable will be 
negative.  Presented below is a summary of each category: 
Market 
Size 
Observation Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Small                   
981  
   
2,934,577  
                    
2,757,838  
    
116,139  
   
15,500,000  
Medium               
1,046  
   
3,566,399  
                    
3,547,483  
    
157,211  
   
21,500,000  
Large               
1,060  
   
3,723,200  
                    
3,678,443  
    
159,825  
   
23,000,000  
 
This new “hybrid” specification is as follows:21 
ln	 
     "#$#%	  &	   
The coefficient of Runs Created is expected to be positive while the coefficient of Small 
variable is expected to be negative. 
 
                                                 
21
 “Runs Created” has been used instead of “Runs” because using Runs Created better depicted the relationship 
between offensive production and salary level in this case.  See Appendix A for the Runs Created formula. 
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Table 3 - Hybrid Method Specification - Batters 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant 14.35573* 13.18182* 13.18573* 
 (32.04) (464.47) (465.32) 
Runs Created 0.0119007* 0.0221799* 0.022163* 
 (2.36) (59.57) (59.72) 
Small -1.208448* -0.8940838* -0.0858057* 
 (-2.50) (-2.79) (-2.93) 
R
2
 0.5737 0.5386 0.5383 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5288 0.5383 0.5380 
Number of Observations 22 3065 3087 
Chow Test 
Critical F value 2.60 
F Statistic 1.966999723 
Conclusion It is correct to assume equal coefficients. 
 
't' values in parentheses 
* Significant at the 5% level 
 
The regression results were very promising.  In all cases, the estimated coefficients’ signs 
were in the expected direction and all of the estimated coefficients were significant at the 3% 
level.  The adjusted R-squared values were 0.5288 for the Japanese batter regression, 0.5383 
for the non-Japanese batter regression and 0.5380 for the combined batter regression.  A 
Chow Test was conducted to determine the degree of difference between the constrained 
regression’s estimated coefficients.  An F statistic of approximately 1.967 was calculated.  
This F-value is less than the critical value of the F distribution (approximately 2.60) at the 5% 
level.  We can conclude that it is correct to 
pool the data. In terms of labor market 
discrimination, this conclusion supports the 
notion that the wage structure across 
Japanese and Non-Japanese batter 
populations is the same.  A table providing a 
summary of this section’s results is 
displayed on the following page; another 
summary is provided in the conclusion to this report. 
In terms of labor market discrimination, 
this conclusion supports the notion that 
the wage structure across Japanese and 
Non-Japanese batter populations is the 
same. 
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Traditional Method Specification Sabermetric Method Specification Hybrid Method Specification 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese 
Pooled 
Sampe Japanese Non-Japanese 
Pooled 
Sample Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant -33.059480 12.77249* 12.67581* -46.795750 6.911381* 6.840096* 14.35573* 13.18182* 13.18573* 
(-1.02) (13.68) (13.57) (-1.63) (7.96) (7.87) (32.04) (464.47) (465.32) 
ln(SLG) 2.885037 1.474381* 1.480376* 
(1.69) (19.17) (19.28) 
ln(ABper) 0.7449075* 0.8940838* 0.8937928* 
(2.37) (5.69) (33.94) 
Age 3.355589 0.3323444* 0.3391687* 3.857727* 0.351889* 0.3568111* 
(1.68) (5.69) (5.81) (2.16) (6.51) (6.60) 
Age
2
 -0.053374 -0.0049254* -0.0050371* -0.0610776* 0.0050582* -0.0051389* 
(-1.74) (-5.44) (-5.56) (2.16) (-6.04) (-6.13) 
Runs 0.0151046* 0.0236116* 0.0235852* 
(3.00) (61.56) (61.69) 
Runs Created 0.0119007* 0.0221799* 0.022163* 
(2.36) (59.57) (59.72) 
Small -1.208448* -0.8940838* -0.0858057* 
(-2.50) (-2.79) (-2.93) 
R
2
 0.5485 0.4781 0.4776 0.5600 0.5538 0.5532 0.5737 0.5386 0.5383 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4423 0.4774 0.4769 0.4867 0.5534 0.5527 0.5288 0.5383 0.5380 
Number of 
Observations 22 3061 3083 22 3065 3087 22 3065 3087 
Critical F value 2.21 2.37 2.60 
F Statistic 1.601375374 1.83414466 1.966999723 
Conclusion It is correct to assume equal coefficients. It is correct to assume equal coefficients. It is correct to assume equal coefficients. 
't' values in parentheses * Significant at the 5% level 
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Oaxaca Decomposition - Batters 
A powerful tool in labor discrimination analysis, called the Oaxaca Decomposition Model, 
was developed by Ronald Oaxaca in the 1970s.  Ronald Oaxaca’s techniques have been 
employed in this study in order to break down the differences in compensation between 
Japanese and Non-Japanese baseball players into two parts—one that can be attributed to 
differences in characteristics22 and one that cannot.  The residual component represents 
discrimination—the difference in compensation not attributable to differences in 
characteristics (Oaxaca, 1973).   
Oaxaca decomposition analysis has been conducted on the sabermetric batter regression 
specification.  As a reminder the sabermetric batter regression is: 
ln	 
    	 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	   
The sabermetric specification was chosen as the researcher deemed it the most robust 
specification.  Only one batter regression was chosen to undergo this analysis because the 
Chow Tests have revealed that pooling the batter data was appropriate.  This supports the 
notion that Japanese batters face little discrimination.  Nonetheless, Oaxaca decomposition 
was still employed to increase the vigor of this study.  The complete results and Stata output 
of the Oaxaca decomposition can be found in Appendix B. 
Before explaining the results of this analysis, a question relevant to the theory of such analysis 
warrants additional explanation.  The main objection to running Oaxaca decomposition in this 
instance is caused by the small sample size of Japanese batter observations.23  Stemming from 
the small sample size, the significance of the explanatory variables in the sabermetric batter 
regression is questionable.  To help mitigate this problem, the statistical technique of random 
resampling (i.e. bootstrapping)24 was utilized.  Unfortunately, the bootstrapping breakdown 
failed to result in strongly significant estimated coefficients for the Japanese batter 
sabermetric specification. 
                                                 
22
 As measured by the regression specification’s explanatory variables 
23
 The batter dataset includes only 22 Japanese batter observations. 
24
 An iterative process in which a series of random samplings are taken and linear regression is subsequently run 
on the random samplings. 
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The Oaxaca decomposition Stata output indicates that the difference in the natural log of 
salary, between Japanese and Non-Japanese batters, is equal to 0.4895785.  Because the 
salary variable is expressed in log form, this means that Non-Japanese batters are paid salaries 
48.95% higher than Japanese batters.  This fact alone does not indicate the presence of 
discrimination whatsoever.  For example, certainly no discrimination would exist if we could 
prove that 100% of the difference in pay is attributable to differences in skill level—this is 
where the Oaxaca decomposition comes in.   
Some explanation of the interpretation of Oaxaca decomposition is needed.  From a 
theoretical perspective, there are four ways to analyze the difference in salary level between 
two groups.  We could compare group A to group B; conversely, we could compare group B 
to group A.  Thirdly, could determine some half-way point and compare each group to that 
point.  And finally, we could apply weights to the observations and compare the results using 
the weighted point of view.  In this study, largely due to the small sample of Japanese player 
data, it makes the most sense to analyze the output from the weighted point of view. 
The weighted results indicate that of the 0.4896 
difference in salary level between the two groups, 
.2305 (47.09%) can be explained by the difference in 
batter characteristics25 and 0.2590 (52.91%) cannot be 
explained by differences in batter characteristics.  In a 
discrimination-free labor market, 100% of the 
difference in salary level would be attributable to 
differences in performance characteristics.  Because 
only 47.09% of the difference in salary level can be 
attributable to differences in batter characteristics, it appears that Japanese batters face salary 
discrimination in Major League Baseball. 
  
                                                 
25
 As indicated by the included explanatory variables 
Oaxaca Decomposition - It 
appears that Japanese batters 
face salary discrimination in 
Major League Baseball. 
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Pitcher Regressions 
A similar framework to the batter regressions was employed as pitcher regressions were 
developed.  Again here three sets of regressions were initially run—a traditional 
specification,26 a sabermetric specification, and finally a hybrid specification utilizing the best 
aspects of each prior regression along with my own theory and ideas.  Each specification will 
include three separate regression components—a Japanese pitcher, a non-Japanese pitcher and 
a pooled pitcher regression.  Chow Tests will be run for each specification set in order to 
evaluate the equivalency of estimated variable coefficients.  If pooling the data is deemed 
appropriate, subsequent Oaxaca decomposition will be conducted to quantify the degree of 
discrimination present.  
The dataset has been modified to only include pitchers with ample playing time.  This will in 
effect eliminate any outlying observations (i.e. pitchers who accumulated no or little pitching 
statistics because of injury, and September call up pitchers).  The cut-off point of thirty 
innings-pitched was deemed appropriate by the researcher.  In addition, only observations 
with lagged salaries and at least four years of experience27 were included.  In making these 
modifications to the dataset, a total of 2,381 observations were dropped.  In total, there were 
2,515 observations—2,471 Non-Japanese pitchers and 4428 Japanese pitchers in the dataset. 
Each regression specification with detailed justification and results will be presented next.  
The specifications will be presented in the following order—traditional method, sabermetric 
method, hybrid method.  Summary tables, presenting the results of each specification’s 
regressions will be shown in tables 4, 5 and 6.  The detailed STATA output, along with Chow 
Test calculations may be found in Appendix C. 
 
  
                                                 
26
 Largely modeled off previous studies, namely Scully’s. 
27
 To include only pitchers with sufficient bargaining power.  Japanese players were included regardless of MLB 
experience. 
28
 18 Japanese observations were dropped because they lacked a lagged salary. 
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Traditional Method Specification – Pitchers 
For pitchers, as with batters, I will model the “traditionalist” baseball method of thinking 
regression specification after Scully’s initial model.  In Scully’s pitcher regression, he 
regressed the log of players’ salary as the dependent variable.  The independent variables used 
to account for pitcher performance were the lifetime strikeout-to-walk ratio and the lifetime 
average percentage of innings pitched out of total innings.29  In Scully’s regression, variables 
to account for team market size, fan intensity and inclusion in the National League were 
included.  However, these variables were found to be insignificant and will not be included in 
my specification.   
My regression will include mostly similar variables to Scully’s, however, I feel that including 
lifetime performance measures do not accurately depict the economic reality of the baseball 
world.  In today’s baseball world, your lifetime statistics are not as important as your current 
statistics.  Baseball can be said to be a “what-have-you-done-for-me-lately?” business.  Thus, 
these performance variables will be included on a season basis.  Included variables are the 
ratio of strikeouts to walks (SW), innings pitched (IP), age,30 and age-squared.  The log of all 
independent performance variables is used in order to interpret percentage changes of these 
variables on salary, in percentage terms.  The specification of the equation is as follows:  
 
ln	 
 0  1 lnSW	  2 lnIP	  3AGE	  4AGE
	   
 
As indicated in the equation, the estimated coefficient of each variable, with the exception of 
age-squared, is expected to be positive.  The estimated coefficient of age-squared is expected 
to be negative to depict the eventual diminishing returns to age in Major League Baseball. 
A series of three regressions were run, one for Japanese players, one for non-Japanese players 
and one combining all pitchers.  Next a Chow Test was performed to evaluate if pooling the 
data were possible.  The full regression output from STATA as well as the Chow Test can be 
found in Appendix C.  Presented below is a summarizing table of the results. 
                                                 
29
 Measured as nine x games x years. 
30
 Again in this instance, age was used, as opposed to experience, to better reflect the tendency of Japanese 
players to develop in Japan for many years prior to coming to MLB.   
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Table 4 -Traditional Method Specification - Pitchers 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant -18.491540 1.322308 1.135362 
 (-1.70) (1.41) (1.22) 
lnSW 0.342087 0.6271473* 0.6301392* 
 (0.98) (15.16) (15.35) 
lnIP 0.430970 0.9138889* 0.9043861* 
 (1.72) (30.25) (30.36) 
Age 1.847313* 0.4754024* 0.3886703* 
 (2.57) (8.28) (.0571649) 
Age
2
 -0.0275738* -0.0065061* -0.006697* 
 (-2.34) (-7.28) (-7.52) 
R
2
 0.3705 0.3751 0.3709 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3060 0.3741 0.3699 
Number of Observations 44 2471 2515 
Chow Test 
Critical F value 2.21 
F Statistic 2.769937625 
Conclusion It is incorrect to assume equal coefficients. 
 
't' values in parentheses 
* Significant at the 5% level 
 
 
The Japanese pitcher regression was not strikingly strong, however, it was not terribly weak.  
The estimated coefficients of both age and age-squared were significantly in their respective 
directions, at the 5% level.  The other variables were in their expected direction, albeit not 
significantly.  The adjusted R-squared is 
quite weak, 0.3060.  The non-Japanese 
pitcher regression output is quite strong.  
Each estimated coefficient was 
significantly in its respective direction, at 
the 5% level.  The adjusted R-squared was 
0.3741, with 2,471 observations.  The 
pooled data largely mirrors the non-
Traditional Method Specification - 
In terms of labor market 
discrimination, this conclusion 
supports the notion that the wage 
structure across Japanese and Non-
Japanese pitcher populations is not 
the same. 
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Japanese pitcher regression.   
The important result from this regression lies in the Chow Test.  The calculated F-statistic is 
greater than the critical F value.  Therefore, it is incorrect to assume equal coefficients.  In 
terms of labor market discrimination, this conclusion supports the notion that the wage 
structure across Japanese and Non-Japanese pitcher populations is not the same. 
It appears that the determinants of a pitcher’s salary differ between Japanese and non-
Japanese players.  This issue will be investigated further via Oaxaca decomposition.  
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Sabermetric Method Specification – Pitchers 
A sabermetric specification, utilizing such well-developed statistics as defensive-independent 
component earned run average (DICE), and walks and hits per innings pitched (WHIP) was 
attempted to be sculpted.  However, after modeling several different specifications, 
combining various sabermetric pitching statistics and other independent variables, no 
conclusive specification could be created.  The specifcaitions run seemed to have strong 
predictive value for either the Japanese pitcher dataset or the non-Japanese pitcher dataset, but 
not both.  This tendency was evident in nearly each sabermetric specification run.  Perhaps 
this indicates that the statistics that predict pitcher salary vary quite widely between Japanese 
and non-Japanese pitchers.  This may yield a conclusion of discrimination—unequal pay for 
equal work in the case of pitchers.  The issue of discrimination will be investigated in the 
Oaxaca decomposition of the two other pitcher 
regression specifications employed.   
  
Sabermetric Method Specification – 
No conclusive labor market 
discrimination conclusions could be 
reached. 
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Hybrid Method Specification – Pitchers 
The traditional specification includes the strikeout-to-walk ratio and innings-pitched of a 
pitcher.  By including these two variables as the only performance measures, overpowering 
pitchers are favored.  Traditional staff “aces” tend to have overpowering fastballs and 
strikeout many batters, walking few, and aggregating many innings-pitched throughout the 
season.  In sculpting my “hybrid” specification, I sought to develop a specification that better 
reflects baseball reality.  A baseball team succeeds when it wins games, thus a pitcher’s wins 
was included as an independent variable.  The wins statistics favors starters as opposed to 
relievers, so saves was also included as an independent variable.  Although one may counter 
that a pitcher’s wins is affected by his team’s defensive ability, and thus may not truly depict 
his talent, wins are still a largely cited statistic in evaluating a pitcher’s ability. 
Continuing on the logic built in the hybrid batter specification, a variable to account for team 
market size was included.  This dummy variable was equal to one if a team is in the smallest 
third of league markets.  The specification is as follows: 
 
ln	 
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A series of three regressions were run, one for Japanese players, one for non-Japanese players 
and one combining all batters.  Next a Chow Test was performed to evaluate if pooling the 
data were possible.  The full regression output from STATA as well as the Chow Test can be 
found in Appendix C.  Presented below is a summarizing table of the results. 
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Table 5 - Hybrid Method Specification - Pitchers 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant -17.507370 5.811774* 5.677091* 
 (-1.90) (6.72) (6.61) 
W_pitch 0.0267386* 0.133005* 0.1322973* 
 (2.78) (40.22) (40.28) 
SV_pitch 0.0267386* 0.0325574* 0.0326926* 
 (2.43) (20.61) (20.88) 
Age 1.923978* 0.4298984* 0.4378198* 
 (0.6097785) (7.92) (8.11) 
Age
2
 -0.029257* -0.157071* -0.0060367* 
 (-2.94) (-7.00) (-7.18) 
Small Market Team -0.8500109* -0.157071* -0.1565574* 
 (-2.45) (-4.63) (-4.64) 
R
2
 0.5625 0.4408 0.4391 
Adjusted R
2
 0.5050 0.4396 0.4379 
Number of Observations 44 2471 2515 
Chow Test 
Critical F value 2.10 
F Statistic 2.303232731 
Conclusion It is incorrect to assume equal coefficients. 
't' values in parentheses 
* Significant at the 5% level 
 
The regression results were quite strong in each of the three regressions.  In every instance, 
the coefficient of each variable was significant, at the 5% level and in its expected direction.  
The adjusted R-square values were higher than 
the traditional specification in each regression.  
Overall this regression appears to be better than 
the traditional method specification.  Again, the 
important result from this regression lies in the 
Chow Test.  The calculated F-statistic is greater 
than the critical F value.  Therefore, it is incorrect 
to assume equal coefficients.  In terms of labor 
market discrimination, this conclusion supports 
Hyrbid Method Specification – 
In terms of labor market 
discrimination, this conclusion 
supports the notion that the 
wage structure across Japanese 
and Non-Japanese pitcher 
populations is not the same. 
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the notion that the wage structure across Japanese and Non-Japanese pitcher populations is 
not the same.  It appears that the determinants of a pitcher’s salary differ between Japanese 
and non-Japanese players.  This issue will be investigated further via Oaxaca decomposition.  
A table providing a summary of this section’s results is displayed on the following page.   
 
Japanese Players in Major League Baseball:  An Econometric Analysis of Labor Discrimination 
Senior Capstone Project for Kyle Audet 
48 
 
Traditional Method Specification Hybrid Method Specification 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Data Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Data 
Constant -18.491540 1.322308 1.135362 -17.507370 5.811774* 5.677091* 
(-1.70) (1.41) (1.22) (-1.90) (6.72) (6.61) 
lnSW 0.342087 0.6271473* 0.6301392* 
(0.98) (15.16) (15.35) 
lnIP 0.430970 0.9138889* 0.9043861* 
(1.72) (30.25) (30.36) 
Age 1.847313* 0.4754024* 0.3886703* 1.923978* 0.4298984* 0.4378198* 
(2.57) (8.28) (.0571649) (0.6097785) (7.92) (8.11) 
Age
2
 -0.0275738* -0.0065061* -0.006697* -0.029257* -0.157071* -0.0060367* 
(-2.34) (-7.28) (-7.52) (-2.94) (-7.00) (-7.18) 
Small -0.8500109* -0.157071* -0.1565574* 
(-2.45) (-4.63) (-4.64) 
W_pitch 0.0267386* 0.133005* 0.1322973* 
(2.78) (40.22) (40.28) 
SV_pitch 0.0267386* 0.0325574* 0.0326926* 
(2.43) (20.61) (20.88) 
R
2
 0.3705 0.3751 0.3709 0.5625 0.4408 0.4391 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3060 0.3741 0.3699 0.5050 0.4396 0.4379 
Number of 
Observations 44 2471 2515 44 2471 2515 
Chow Test 
Critical F 
value 2.21 2.10 
F Statistic 2.769937625 2.303232731 
Conclusion It is incorrect to assume equal coefficients. It is incorrect to assume equal coefficients. 
't' values in parentheses * Significant at the 5% level 
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Oaxaca Decomposition – Pitchers 
Following the logic outlined in the Oaxaca decomposition analysis of the batter data, the 
pitcher data has been analyzed.  The same commentary regarding theoretical and 
interpretation issues apply in this case.  Oaxaca decomposition analysis has been conducted 
on both of the original pitchers regressions.  The full Stata output can be found in Appendix 
C.  As a reminder the two pitcher regression specifications are: 
Traditional Method:  ln	 
 0  1 lnSW	  2 lnIP	  3AGE	  4AGE	   
Hybrid Method:  ln	 
   Wins	  Saves	  AGE	  AGE	 
8&	   
The results can be found below; complete Stata output is located in Appendix C. 
The Oaxaca decomposition Stata output indicates that the difference in the natural log of 
salary, between Japanese and Non-Japanese pitchers, is equal to 0.0888.  Because the salary 
variable is expressed in log form, this means that Non-Japanese pitchers are paid salaries 
8.88% higher than Japanese pitchers.  This fact alone does not indicate the presence of 
discrimination whatsoever.  For example, certainly no discrimination would exist if we could 
prove that 100% of the difference in pay is attributable to differences in skill level—this is 
where the Oaxaca decomposition comes in.   
Traditional Method 
The Oaxaca output from both the traditional and hybrid pitcher specifications is very 
interesting.  The traditional method’s data will be presented first.  The weighted results 
indicate that of the 0.0888 difference in 
salary level between the two groups, -
0.1267 (-143.74%) can be explained by the 
difference in pitcher characteristics31 and 
0.2154 (244.48%) cannot be explained by 
                                                 
31
 As indicated by the included explanatory variables 
Oaxaca Decomposition (Traditional 
Method Specification) – Japanese 
pitchers face high levels of salary 
discrimination. 
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differences in pitcher characteristics.  The interpretation of such results can take some time to 
get used to.  This situation is equivalent to a group of highly educated workers being paid less 
than a group of less educated workers.  This situation goes beyond discrimination.  The 
Japanese pitchers exhibit superior pitching talent and receive less!  Over 200% of the 
difference in salary level cannot be attributed to differences in pitcher performance!   
Hybrid Method 
The results of the hybrid method specification mirror those of the traditional method 
specification.  The weighted results indicate that of the 0.0888 difference in salary level 
between the two groups, -0.1388 (-156.32%) can be explained by the difference in pitcher 
characteristics32 and 0.2276 (256.32%) cannot be explained by differences in pitcher 
characteristics.  Because over 200% of the difference in salary level cannot be attributable to 
differences in pitcher characteristics, it appears that Japanese pitchers face a high degree of 
salary discrimination in Major League Baseball. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
32
 As indicated by the included explanatory variables 
Oaxaca Decomposition (Hybrid 
Method Specification) – Japanese 
pitchers face high levels of salary 
discrimination. 
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Evaluating Average Difference in Salary Level 
These regressions investigate the average difference in salary level between Japanese and 
non-Japanese (a) batters and (b) pitchers. 
Batters 
 
A dummy variable, “Japan”, equal to one if a player is Japanese and zero if a player is non-
Japanese, was added to each pooled batter regression specification previously run.  This 
dummy variable will be tacked-on to each regression and the results will be interpreted.  I 
hypothesize that the dummy variable’s estimated coefficient will be positive.  This makes 
sense as it is likely that a Major League Baseball team would be willing to pay a Japanese 
player a premium to entice him to play in America.  A plausible explanation for this is that 
perhaps American baseball teams feel that they can capitalize from an affluent Asian fan base 
if their team includes Japanese players.  The same hypotheses regarding the remaining 
independent variables’ estimated coefficients from the each pooled regression still apply.  
Table 6 displays a summary of the effect of including the “Japan” dummy variable.33 
Table 6 – Average Differences in Salary Level - Batters 
Regression Estimated Coefficient 
of "Japan" 
Sign P-value Effect of adjusted R
2
 
Traditional 0.2594886 + 0.132 Increase 
Sabermetric 0.1500573 + 0.347 No Effect 
Hybrid -0.0316807 – 0.317 Increase 
 
                                                 
33
 The full STATA outputs may be found in Appendix D. 
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Traditional Method Specification Sabermetric Method Specificaition Hybrid Method Specification 
Variable Japanese 
Non-
Japanese 
Pooled 
Sample Japanese 
Non-
Japanese 
Pooled 
Sample Japanese 
Non-
Japanese 
Pooled 
Sample 
Constant -33.059480 12.77249* 12.71623* -46.795750 6.911381* 6.866354* 14.35573* 13.18182* -1.127553* 
 
(-1.02) (13.68) (13.62) (-1.63) (7.96) (7.90) (32.04) (464.47) (-202.98) 
ln(SLG) 2.885037 1.474381* 1.481094* 
      
 
(1.69) (19.17) (19.3) 
      ln(ABper) 0.7449075* 0.8940838* 0.8927026* 
      
 
(2.37) (5.69) (33.90) 
      Age 3.355589 0.3323444* 0.3363722* 3.857727* 0.351889* 0.3551582* 
   
 
(1.68) (5.69) (5.76) (2.16) (6.51) (6.57) 
   
Age
2
 -0.053374 -0.0049254* -0.0049939* 
-
0.0610776* 0.0050582* -0.0051134* 
   
 
(-1.74) (-5.44) (-5.51) (2.16) (-6.04) (-6.10) 
   Runs 
   
0.0151046* 0.0236116* 0.0235732* 
   
    
(3.00) (61.56) (61.62) 
   Runs Created 
      
0.0119007* 0.0221799* 0.0042926* 
       
(2.36) (59.57) (59.06) 
Small 
      
-1.208448* -0.8940838* 0.0052367* 
       
(-2.50) (-2.79) (0.91) 
Japan 
  
0.2594886 
  
0.1500573 
  
-0.0316807 
   
(1.51) 
  
(0.94) 
  
(-1.00) 
R
2
 0.5485 0.4781 0.4780 0.5600 0.5538 0.5533 0.5737 0.5386 0.5314 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4423 0.4774 0.4771 0.4867 0.5534 0.5527 0.5288 0.5383 0.5309 
Number of Observations 22 3061 3083 22 3065 3087 22 3065 3087 
't' values in parentheses * Significant at the 5% level 
      
 
 
Japanese Players in Major League Baseball:  An Econometric Analysis of Labor 
Discrimination 
Senior Capstone Project for Kyle Audet 
53 
 
The conclusion of these regressions, regarding the 
average differences in salary level between Japanese and 
non-Japanese batters, is inconclusive.  In some cases, the 
inclusion of the dummy variable strengthened the overall 
fit of the specification,34 while compromising the 
significance of individual estimated coefficients of some 
of the variables.  In some cases the estimated coefficient 
of the Japan dummy variable was in the expected 
direction, however, the significance of this coefficient is 
weak.  We cannot conclude that Japanese batters are paid a premium over equally-skilled, 
non-Japanese players.  
                                                 
34
 As measured by the adjusted R-squared. 
We cannot conclude that 
Japanese batters are paid 
a premium over equally-
skilled, non-Japanese 
players. 
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Pitchers 
A dummy variable, “Japan”, equal to one if a player is Japanese and zero if a player is non-
Japanese, was added to each pooled pitcher regression specification previously run.  This 
dummy variable will be tacked-on to each regression and the results will be interpreted.  I 
hypothesize that the dummy variable’s estimated coefficient will be positive.  This makes 
sense as it is likely that a Major League Baseball team will be willing to pay a Japanese player 
a premium to entice him to play in America.  A plausible explanation for this is that perhaps 
American baseball teams feel that they can capitalize from an affluent Asian fan base if their 
team includes Japanese players.  The same hypotheses regarding the remaining independent 
variables’ estimated coefficients from the each pooled regression still apply.  Table 7 displays 
a summary of the effect of including the “Japan” dummy variable.35  The more complete data 
is presented on the subsequent page. 
Table 7 – Average Difference in Salary Level, Pitchers 
Regression Estimated Coefficient of 
"Japan" 
Sign P-value Effect of adjusted R
2
 
Traditional -0.2159403 — 0.088 Increased 
Hybrid -0.2288458 — 0.056 Increased 
 
In both instances, the coefficient of the “Japan” 
dummy variable is negative.  This suggests that all 
else being equal (performance, age, and team 
market), Japanese pitchers are paid less than 
comparable non-Japanese pitchers.  These results 
are very interesting, although they disprove my original hypothesis.  Perhaps teams feel that 
the cultural and language barriers between Japanese and non-Japanese pitchers warrants 
discounting their pitching ability.  Furthermore, perhaps Japanese pitchers are unfairly viewed 
as having less skill during the hiring (scouting in the case of Major League Baseball), process.  
Further investigation into the discriminatory pay practices against Japanese pitchers can be 
found in the Oaxaca decomposition performed in this study.
                                                 
35
 The full STATA outputs may be found in Appendix D. 
All else equal, Japanese 
pitchers are paid less than 
comparable non-Japanese. 
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Traditional Method Specification Hybrid Method Specification 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese 
Pooled 
Sample Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant -18.491540 1.322308 1.070845 -17.507370 5.811774* 5.616929* 
 
(-1.70) (1.41) (1.15) (-1.90) (6.72) (6.54) 
lnSW 0.342087 0.6271473* 0.6298058* 
   
 
(0.98) (15.16) (15.34) 
   lnIP 0.430970 0.9138889* 0.9057056* 
   
 
(1.72) (30.25) (30.41) 
   Age 1.847313* 0.4754024* 0.4925648* 1.923978* 0.4298984* 0.441934* 
 
(2.57) (8.28) (8.61) (0.6097785) (7.92) (8.19) 
Age
2
 -0.0275738* -0.0065061* -0.0067567* -0.029257* -0.157071* -0.0061009* 
 
(-2.34) (-7.28) (-7.58) (-2.94) (-7.00) (-7.25) 
Small 
   
-0.8500109* -0.157071* -0.1604358* 
    
(-2.45) (-4.63) (-4.75) 
W_pitch 
   
0.0267386* 0.133005* 0.1323636* 
    
(2.78) (40.22) (40.32) 
SV_pitch 
   
0.0267386* 0.0325574* 0.0327139* 
    
(2.43) (20.61) (20.90) 
Japan 
  
-0.2159403 
  
-0.2288458 
   
(-1.71) 
  
(-1.92) 
R
2
 0.3705 0.3751 0.3717 0.5625 0.4408 0.4399 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3060 0.3741 0.3704 0.5050 0.4396 0.4385 
Number of 
Observations 44 2471 2515 44 2471 2515 
't' values in parentheses 
 
* Significant at the 5% level 
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Evaluating Returns to Age 
These regressions investigate the difference in returns to age between Japanese and non-
Japanese (a) batters and (b) pitchers. 
Batters 
An interaction variable was added to each pooled batter regression specification previously 
run.36  These specifications include an interaction variable to account for the different returns 
to age for Japanese players.  I hypothesize that the estimated coefficient of this variable will 
be positive.  When a team hires a young player (Japanese or otherwise), the team bears a large 
risk due to the uncertainty associated with predicting that player’s future performance (i.e. 
will success in college/high school translate to the major leagues, will that player adapt to 
professional baseball life, etc.).  International scouting divisions are not as robust as their 
domestic counterparts; therefore, team’s have even less information to use in evaluating 
foreign prospective players’ future performance prospects.   
The cultural change from playing baseball in Japan to playing in America (or vice versa) is a 
large one.  Indeed, much of Robert Whiting’s You Gotta Have Wa, and The Meaning of 
Ichiro, is devoted to explaining some of the major cultural differences between the two 
nations’ baseball worlds.  Therefore, it is logical to believe that a Major League Baseball team 
would pay more for proven veteran Japanese players (i.e. older players), who have developed 
and proven their skill set on American turf, in Major League Baseball, as opposed to a 
Japanese player coming straight out of Japan.  Table 8 displays a summary of the effect of 
including the “Japan” dummy variable.37  The more complete data is presented on the 
subsequent page. 
                                                 
36
 The original specifications, as opposed from the specifications designed to evaluate average differences in 
salary level between Japanese and non-Japanese players (the immediately previous section). 
37
 The full STATA outputs may be found in Appendix E. 
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Table 8 – Returns to Age, Batters 
Regression Estimated Coefficient of 
"Japan*Age" 
Sign P-value Effect of adjusted R
2
 
Traditional 0.0076373 + 0.164 Increase 
Sabermetric 0.0043989 + 0.386 No Effect 
Hybrid 0.0068705 + 0.183 Increase 
 
These results are mixed.  The inclusion of the interaction term never hurt the specifications 
overall fit38.  In all instances the estimated coefficient of the interaction term was positive, 
indicating that the returns to age for a Japanese batter are greater than the returns to age for a 
non-Japanese batter.  However, the significance of the variable was slightly weak in two cases 
and very weak in one case.  
                                                 
38
 As measured by the adjusted R-squared value. 
We cannot conclude that 
Japanese batters receive 
higher returns to age 
than non-Japanese. 
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Traditional Method Specification Sabermetric Method Specification Hybrid Method Specification 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample Japanese 
Non-
Japanese 
Pooled 
Sample Japanese 
Non-
Japanese 
Pooled 
Sample 
Constant -33.059480 12.77249* 12.71332* -46.795750 6.911381* 6.864153* 14.35573* 13.18182* 13.18464* 
 
(-1.02) (13.68) (13.61) (-1.63) (7.96) (7.90) (32.04) (464.47) (465.15) 
ln(SLG) 2.885037 1.474381* 1.480923* 
      
 
(1.69) (19.17) (19.29) 
      ln(ABper) 0.7449075* 0.8940838* 0.8928816* 
      
 
(2.37) (5.69) (33.90) 
      Age 3.355589 0.3323444* 0.33661* 3.857727* 0.351889* 0.3553071* 
   
 
(1.68) (5.69) (5.76) (2.16) (6.51) (6.57) 
   
Age
2
 -0.053374 -0.0049254* -0.004998* 
-
0.0610776* 0.0050582* -0.0051159* 
   
 
(-1.74) (-5.44) (-5.52) (2.16) (-6.04) (-6.10) 
   Runs 
   
0.0151046* 0.0236116* 0.023575* 
   
    
(3.00) (61.56) (61.63) 
   Runs 
Created 
      
0.0119007* 0.0221799* 0.0221517* 
       
(2.36) (59.57) (59.68) 
SmallMarket 
      
-1.208448* -0.8940838* -0.0850534* 
       
(-2.50) (-2.79) (-2.90) 
Japan*Age 
  
0.0076373 
  
0.0043989 
  
0.0068705 
   
(1.39) 
  
(7.90) 
  
(1.33) 
R
2
 0.5485 0.4781 0.4779 0.5600 0.5538 0.5533 0.5737 0.5386 0.5386 
Adjusted R
2
 0.4423 0.4774 0.4771 0.4867 0.5534 0.5527 0.5288 0.5383 0.5381 
Number of 
Observations 22 3061 3083 22 3065 3087 22 3065 3087 
't' values in parentheses * Significant at the 5% level 
      
Japanese Players in Major League Baseball:  An Econometric Analysis of Labor 
Discrimination 
Senior Capstone Project for Kyle Audet 
59 
 
Pitchers 
 
The same process detailed above was conducted on the original two pitcher regression 
specifications.  Using the same logic, the hypothesized estimated coefficient of the interaction 
variable is positive.  The results are summarized and explained below.  The more complete 
data is presented on the subsequent page. 
 
 
Table 9 – Returns to Age, Pitchers 
Regression Estimated Coefficient of 
"Japan*Age" 
Sign P-value Effect of adjusted R
2
 
Traditional -0.0057914 — 0.153 Increase 
Hybrid -0.0066338 — 0.084 Increase 
 
 
The results are intriguing.  The inclusion of the interaction term strengthened both 
specifications.39  In both cases, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term was negative.  
The hypothesis stating that Japanese pitchers with proven experience (measured using age as 
a proxy) would be paid premiums, compared to non-
Japanese pitchers was proven false.  These findings 
are more robust given the significance of the 
interaction term; in both cases the estimated 
coefficient was fairly significant (see p-values). 
                                                 
39
 As measured by the adjusted R-squared value. 
Japanese pitchers with 
proven success are paid 
less than non-Japanese 
pitchers. 
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Traditional Method Specification Hybrid Method Specification 
Variable Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample Japanese Non-Japanese Pooled Sample 
Constant -18.491540 1.322308 1.072015 -17.507370 5.811774* 5.611269* 
 
(-1.70) (1.41) (1.15) (-1.90) (6.72) (6.53) 
lnSW 0.342087 0.6271473* 0.6298631* 
   
 
(0.98) (15.16) (15.34) 
   lnIP 0.430970 0.9138889* 0.9053865* 
   
 
(1.72) (30.25) (30.39) 
   Age 1.847313* 0.4754024* 0.49249* 1.923978* 0.4298984* 0.4421845* 
 
(2.57) (8.28) (8.61) (0.6097785) (7.92) (8.19) 
Age
2
 -0.0275738* -0.0065061* -0.0067547* -0.029257* -0.157071* -0.0061037* 
 
(-2.34) (-7.28) (-7.58) (-2.94) (-7.00) (-7.25) 
Small 
   
-
0.8500109* -0.157071* -0.1599309* 
    
(-2.45) (-4.63) (-4.74) 
W_pitch 
   
0.0267386* 0.133005* 0.1323587* 
    
(2.78) (40.22) (40.31) 
SV_pitch 
   
0.0267386* 0.0325574* 0.0327212* 
    
(2.43) (20.61) (20.91) 
JapanxAge 
  
-0.0057914 
  
-0.0066338 
   
(-1.43) 
  
(-1.73) 
R
2
 0.3705 0.3751 0.3714 0.5625 0.4408 0.4391 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3060 0.3741 0.3702 0.5050 0.4396 0.4379 
Number of 
Observations 44 2471 2515 44 2471 2515 
't' values in parentheses 
 
* Significant at the 5% level 
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POSITIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
Perhaps Japanese players experience on-field discrimination, in addition to or in place of pay 
discrimination.  On-field discrimination takes shape when certain groups of people are 
restricted from playing certain positions.  For example, research has been conducted in 
examining the utter lack of African-American quarterbacks in the National Football League40.  
Other examples of positional discrimination research include discrimination against African-
American infielders in baseball and French Canadian offense and defensemen on English 
Canadian hockey teams.  The hockey example may be a better example of segregation—
where certain teams display discriminatory practices.  This topic, as concerned with Japanese 
players in Major League Baseball will be examined in a subsequent section of this paper. 
The data used in this analysis is a combination of the datasets used in the above regression 
analysis.  This dataset includes both pitchers and batters from the 1995 season through the 
2007 season.  569 records were deleted because positional information was not available in 
the dataset.  The total dataset includes 10,971 records.  When a player’s record indicated that 
he play multiple positions, the first positional record was taken to be his primary position for 
this analysis.   
The player records were dichotomized into a Japanese and non-Japanese element.  I analyzed 
positional segregation by examining the proportion of players in each category by position.  
Positions were aggregated into two (Batters or Pitchers) and four categories (Infielders, 
Outfielders,41 Pitchers, or Catchers).  Table 10 and Table 11 display the data from these 
analyses; Figures 1 and 2 display this data visually in the form of pie charts. 
Table 10 - Players by Position, 2 Categories 
 
  
 
Batters Pitchers 
Non-Japanese 5801 5077 
Japanese 30 62 
Grand Total 5831 5139 
 
                                                 
40A paper by Jason Chung available at the following URL is a good resource: http://ssrn.com/abstract=835204. 
41
 Includes designated hitters (DH). 
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Figure 1 - Players by Position, 2 Categories 
 
The Z-test for two proportions was conducted on the above statistics.42  This type of statistical 
test is used to determine whether two proportions are significantly different.  The null 
hypothesis stating that both proportions are equal was tested.  For both pitchers and batters, 
this null hypothesis was not confirmed.  At the 90% confidence level, the proportion of 
Japanese players who are pitchers is significantly different from the proportion of non-
Japanese players who are pitchers.  The same 
statement is true for batters. 
 
  
                                                 
42
 A handy calculator found at http://www.dimensionresearch.com/resources/calculators/ztest.html was utilized 
for this analysis. 
Batters
33%
Pitchers
67%
Japanese
Batters
53%
Pitchers
47%
Non-Japanese
At the 90% confidence level, the 
proportion of Japanese players 
who are pitchers is significantly 
different from the proportion of 
non-Japanese players who are 
pitchers.  The same statement is 
true for batters. 
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Table 11 - Players by Position, Four Categories 
 
    
 
IF OF C P 
Japanese 11 17 2 62 
Non-Japanese 3290 1814 697 5077 
Grand Total 3301 1831 699 5139 
 
Figure 2 - Players by Position, 4 Categories 
 
IF
12%
OF
19%
C
2%
P
67%
Japanese
IF
30%
OF
17%C
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P
47%
Non-Japanese
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The Z-test for two proportions was conducted on the above statistics.43  The null hypothesis 
stating that both proportions are equal was tested.  For both pitchers and infielders, this null 
hypothesis was not confirmed.  At the 90% confidence level, the proportion of Japanese 
players who are pitchers is significantly different from the proportion of non-Japanese players 
who are pitchers.  The same statement is true for 
infielders.  The null hypothesis was rejected on 
the Z tests performed for catchers and 
outfielders—the proportion of Japanese players 
who are outfielders (catchers) is not significantly 
different from the proportion of Non-Japanese 
players who are outfielders (catchers).
                                                 
43
 Again, the calculator found at http://www.dimensionresearch.com/resources/calculators/ztest.html was utilized 
in this analysis. 
Between Japanese and Non-
Japanese players, the proportion 
of players that are outfielders and 
catchers are not significantly 
different.   
 
Between Japanese and Non-
Japanese players, the proportion 
of players that are infielders and 
pitchers are significantly 
different.   
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CUSTOMER DISCRIMIATION:  DOES MARKET REPRESENTATION 
INFLUENCE TEAM REPRESENTATION 
For this section of the study, United States’ Census data, from the year 2000 census, was 
analyzed in relation to the number of Japanese players employed by given Major League 
Baseball teams.  The U.S. Census data utilized in this study was downloaded from 
http://www.census.gov.  I hypothesize that teams with large Asian fan bases are more likely to 
employ larger numbers of Japanese players.  This kind of research, examining the relationship 
between fan base and team representativeness, has been widely conducted, mostly in the area 
of African-Americans in the National Basketball Association (NBA).44  The customer-
discrimination hypothesis tells us that teams lose revenue and profits when they adopt color-
neutral hiring practices (Burdekin, Hossfield, & Smith, 2005).  Put more simply, this theory 
says that teams factor a player’s race into the hiring decision due to discrimination by the 
fan.45 
For purposes of this study, I will model much of my analysis in the same general 
methodology demonstrated by Burdekin, Hossfield and Smith in their 2005 article “Are NBA 
Fans Becoming Indifferent to Race?”  For my analysis, I created a spreadsheet file linking: 
teams, Asian populations,46 and the number of Japanese players employed (in total).  Thus 
there will initially be thirty-four observations, one for each Major League team.47  In 
conducting this analysis, several assumptions and limitations were encountered.  The most 
recent team location and stadiums were used for teams that have previously moved.  State 
populations were used instead of city populations.  The Toronto Blue Jays were not included 
in the study because only 2000 United States Census data was used.  Additionally, the Tampa 
Bay Devil Rays were dropped because they did not have sufficient years of data, as compared 
to the other organizations.   
                                                 
44
 I most frequently reference a 2005 study by Burdekin, Hossfield and Smith.  Also see works by: Brown, Spiro 
& Keenan (2001); Burdekin & Idson (1991); Hoang & Rascher (1999); and Koch & Vander Hill (1988). 
45
 (i.e. white fans prefer watching white players, African-American fans prefer watching African-American 
players, etc.) 
46
 Measured at the state level. 
47
 This is not equal to thirty due to teams that moved locations during the sample time period. 
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The regression equation seeks to shed light on the determinants of a team’s racial 
composition.48  Therefore, the dependent variable in the regression specification is the team’s 
racial composition.  Building on earlier studies49 the independent variables in this study—
those that act to explain a team’s racial composition—are: the racial composition of the 
team’s state and the ratio of the team’s stadium capacity to the population of its state.  This 
last variable is included because teams with larger markets need not match their teams’ roster 
racial composition to that of their fan bases to the extent of their small market competitors.50  
Ultimately, customer discrimination affects teams in small markets more.  In equation format, 
the regression appears as follows: 
team composition 
   >#?#$>@>ABC$#	  
stadium capacity
$$# >@> $C@
	   
The regression results provide little value to this study.  The full Stata output has not been 
included because of its lack of significance.  In hindsight, this analysis was limited from the 
beginning.  The data pool of observations was limited.  The Asian/Non Asian study, as 
compared to the black/white studies of customer discrimination in the NBA, contains much 
fewer data observations.  As the years continue, more and more Asian players in MLB will 
increase the validity of such an exercise.  Many of 
the assumptions51 were made during the data 
gathering process only compounded the problem.  
This is an area that should be explored by further 
researchers.   
                                                 
48
 Race in the context of Asian or Non Asian.  The researcher has observed that MLB teams are largely equal in 
their propensity to employ African-Americans. 
49
 Namely Burdekin, Hossfield and Smith’s 2005 article “Are NBA Fans Becoming Indifferent to Race?” 
50
 Large market teams have a larger pool from which to attract paying fans. 
51
 Using state census data instead of standard metropolitan statistical areas; simply using the most recent stadium 
and locations for teams that have moved; eliminating the one Canadian team (the Toronto Blue Jays); 
aggregating statistics. 
The customer discrimination 
analysis provided inconclusive 
results and should be the basis of 
a future study.   
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SEGREGATION AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS: INCLUSIVE VS. 
HOMOGENEOUS 
In the workplace, employers have incentives to hire a diverse pool of employees.  In many 
cases, the combination of people with unique histories, talents, and ideas produces superior 
performance—as compared to homogeneous sets of employees (Davis & Bryant, 2008).  A 
logical question to ask would be—does this affect of performance enhancement via diversity 
apply to professional sports, specifically Major League Baseball.  MLB teams were 100% 
white until the Brooklyn Dodgers hired Jackie Robinson in 1947.  Although some teams were 
slow to integrate (i.e. the Boston Red Sox through the 1950s), in the recent past all MLB 
teams stand on roughly equal footing regarding the integration of African Americans.  
However, teams do differ in their integration with respect to Japanese born players.  Teams 
like the Seattle Mariners, Boston Red Sox, and New York Yankees have integrated their 
rosters with Japanese players much more rapidly than teams like the Minnesota Twins, 
Pittsburgh Pirates, and Cleveland Indians.  I will investigate which characteristics Japanese 
inclusive teams share as well as whether their integration has led to increased success—
namely in the categories of wins and attendance. 
For this aspect of the study, simple statistical tools52 have been employed.  First teams have 
been categorized according to their nature of inclusion of Japanese players.53  The team 
breakdown and accompanying graphs are displayed on the subsequent pages.   
 
                                                 
52
 Mean, minimum, maximum and standard deviation 
53
 The Toronto Blue Jays were dropped because of their Canadian location.  The Arizona Diamondbacks as well 
as the Tampa Bay Rays were dropped because they are expansion teams for which we do not have complete 
data. 
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Inclusive  Semi-Inclusive  Homogeneous 
Teams Japanese Players 
('95-'07) 
 Teams Japanese Players 
('95-'07) 
 Teams Japanese Players 
('95-'07) 
SEA 18  MIL 3  ATL 0 
LAD 11  TEX 3  BAL 0 
NYM 9  COL 2  CHC 0 
NYY 9  DET 2  CIN 0 
WSN 7  KCR 2  CLE 0 
ANA 5  SDP 2  FLA 0 
CHW 5  OAK 1  HOU 0 
STL 5  SFG 1  MIN 0 
BOS 4     PHI 0 
      PIT 0 
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1 - Inclusive 2 - Semi-Inclusive 3 - Homogeneous
Average Wins
840 
860 
880 
900 
920 
940 
960 
980 
1 - Inclusive 2 - Semi-Inclusive 3 - Homogeneous
Minimum Wins
1,000 
1,050 
1,100 
1,150 
1,200 
1,250 
1,300 
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880 
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Combined Wins Analysis
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3 - Homogeneous 2 - Semi-Inclusive 1 - Inclusive
Inclusive Teams by Market Size
Large Medium Small
Japanese Players in Major League Baseball:  An Econometric Analysis of Labor 
Discrimination 
Senior Capstone Project for Kyle Audet 
72 
 
This section of the study is very interesting.  Inclusive teams tend to be located on the east and 
west coast and in large metropolitan markets.  It appears that “early adopters” of Japanese 
players54 have achieved superior performance in the categories of wins and total attendance as 
compared to those teams that have not integrated Japanese players into their rosters.  In 
addition, inclusive teams’ win totals are more tightly centered around its mean, as compared 
to homogeneous teams.  It should be 
mentioned that this apparent causal relationship 
(Model A) could indeed be spurious (Model 
B).  It is likely that a second variable55 drives 
this relationship.  The two models are 
displayed below.  Nonetheless, this is another 
area that should be further investigated.  By 
controlling for variables like market size, 
future research will yield more robust results. 
Model A: 
 
 
Model B: 
 
                                                 
54
 Those classified as Inclusive 
55
 Likely market size 
Japanese Inclusion
(+)
Wins
(+)
Attendance
(+)
Market Size
(+)
Japanese 
Inclusion
(+)
Wins
(+)
Attendance
(+)
More research needs to be 
conducted prior to reaching 
concrete conclusions regarding 
the causality between Japanese 
player inclusion and superior 
performance.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
Using Major League Baseball statistics of the 1995 through 2007 seasons,56 this study has 
investigated the issue of labor discrimination, specifically in terms of Japanese players.  As 
outlined in the introductory section, this study intended to answer seven specific questions. 
1. What are the best salary predictors for Japanese-born players playing in the United 
States and do these differ from non-Japanese players? 
A detailed summary of the salary regression and Oaxaca decomposition is provided on page 
75.  Salary discrimination, defined as unequal pay for equal work, was examined first.  My 
results indicate that Japanese batters, compared to non-Japanese batters, do not face salary 
discrimination.  Japanese pitchers, however, do suffer from salary discrimination.  In some 
cases,57 the level of discrimination is very high.   
2. Does the average salary level of equally talented players58 differ between Japanese 
and Non-Japanese? 
In terms of average salary levels, the distinction between batters and pitchers is also evident.  
All else equal, Japanese pitchers are paid less than comparable non-Japanese pitchers.  
However, the results from the batters’ regressions are not as concrete.  Therefore, we cannot 
conclude that Japanese batters are paid premiums over equally skilled, non-Japanese players. 
3. Do returns-to-experience59 in MLB differ between Japanese and Non-Japanese? 
In answering this question, the results mirror the earlier results—Japanese pitchers face high 
levels of discrimination.  Japanese pitchers with proven success are paid less than non-
Japanese pitchers with proven success.  However, once again we cannot make concrete 
conclusions regarding Japanese batters.   
4. Do Japanese-born players playing in the United States face positional 
discrimination? 
Japanese players are disproportionally pitchers as compared to batters.  However, the gap is 
closing and more Japanese batters are coming to MLB each year.  Between Japanese and 
                                                 
56
 The full dataset from Sean Lahman’s Baseball Archive can be downloaded at http://www.baseball1.com.  
57
 Namely in the Oaxaca decomposition analysis 
58
 For both batters and pitchers 
59
 For both batters and pitchers 
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Non-Japanese players, the proportion of players that are outfielders are not significantly 
different.  The same statement is true for catchers.  Thus, Japanese players do not face unfair 
disadvantages in the context of playing the outfield and catcher position.  Between Japanese 
and Non-Japanese players, the proportion of players that are infielders are significantly 
different.  This means that Japanese players do face unfair disadvantages in the context of 
playing the infield positions.   
5. Do Japanese-born players playing in the United States face customer 
discrimination? 
Previous studies have indicated that fans prefer watching players of their own race.  This 
study reached inconclusive results regarding the customer discrimination hypothesis.  This 
area should be the basis of a future study.   
6. Do inclusive teams60 perform better61 than their homogeneous counterparts? 
Teams classified as “Inclusive” have achieved higher levels of wins and total attendance as 
compared to teams classified as “Homogeneous”.  These results alone cannot prove causality.  
Future studies could focus on this topic.  In such studies, variables like market size should be 
held constant. 
7. What are the characteristics of inclusive teams62 and do they differ from their 
homogeneous counterparts? 
Inclusive teams tend to be located on the east and west coast.  In general, Homogenous teams 
tend to be located inland.  Inclusive teams tend to be located in large metropolitan markets.  
Homogeneous teams tend to be located in small metropolitan markets.   
 
                                                 
60
 With respect to Japanese born players 
61
 In terms of team wins 
62
 With respect to Japanese born players 
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Salary Regressions 
Batters 
Traditional Specificaition It is correct to pool the data Nondiscriminatory 
Sabermetric Specification It is correct to pool the data Nondiscriminatory 
Hybrid Specification It is correct to pool the data Nondiscriminatory 
Oaxaca (Sabermetric) 
47.09% of the difference in salary level can be attributable 
to differences in batter characteristics. 
Japanese batters face salary discrimination in Major League 
Baseball.  
Pitchers 
Traditional Specificaition It is incorrect to pool the data 
Japanese pitchers face salary discrimination in Major League 
Baseball.  
Sabermetric Specification N/A N/A 
Hybrid Specification It is incorrect to pool the data 
Japanese pitchers face salary discrimination in Major League 
Baseball.  
Oaxaca (Traditional) 
-143.74% can be explained by the difference in pitcher 
characteristics and  244.48%) cannot be explained by 
differences in pitcher characteristics.   
Japanese pitchers face high degrees of salary discrimination 
in Major League Baseball.  
Oaxaca (Hybrid) 
-156.32% can be explained by the difference in pitcher 
characteristics and 256.32% cannot be explained by 
differences in pitcher characteristics. 
Japanese pitchers face high degrees of salary discrimination 
in Major League Baseball.  
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   Evaluating Average Differences in Salary Level 
Batters Mixed results - inconclusive 
We cannot conclude that Japanese batters are paid a 
premium over equally skilled, non-Japanese players. 
Pitchers Dummy variable's coefficient negative, increased R-squared. 
All else equal, Japanese pitchers are paid less than 
comparable non-Japanese. 
   Evaluating Returns to Age 
Batters Mixed results - inconclusive 
We cannot conclude that Japanese batters receive higher 
returns to age than non-Japanese. 
Pitchers 
Interaction variable's coeffcieint negative, increased R-
squared. 
Japanese pitchers with proven success are paid less than 
non-Japanese pitchers with proven success. 
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Limitations and Areas for Future Study 
 
It is important to note the main limitations present in this study.  The number of Japanese 
player observations in Major League Baseball is significantly smaller than the number of non-
Japanese player observations.  With such a small sample size, it is possible that some of the 
patterns observed may have occurred simply by chance.  Relevant econometric techniques—
bootstrapping and repetitive random sampling—have been used to help combat this 
limitation.  None of the econometric literature discounts the relevance of the Chow Test under 
such discrepancies; nonetheless, the conclusions of this study would be strengthened with the 
presence of additional Japanese player observations. 
Several decisions were made in the preparing the relational database for analysis.  The 
database was modified such that only players with sufficient bargaining power and playing 
time were included.  Also for my research purposes I aggregated player statistics for players 
with multiple “stints”63 or positions by year.  It is believed that any errors in this process 
would be random and self-cancelling. 
This research project has opened the doors for many future studies.  Because of the limited 
number of Japanese players playing in Major League Baseball, there are many areas of this 
study that could be made more robust, given more observations.  All of the salary 
regressions—the sabermetric, traditional, hybrid, returns to age, average differences in salary 
level—would benefit from increased Japanese samples.  Positional discrimination may prove 
to be spurious—perhaps an additional variable(s) is determining what positions Japanese 
ballplayers play in Major League Baseball.  Similarly, before making concrete conclusions 
regarding customer discrimination, future studies need to be conducted to account for other 
variables.  More data observations will help solidify any such theories.  The barriers to entry 
and exit in MLB could be another interesting topic for future researchers. 
                                                 
63
 Trades between teams, call-ups / send-downs, in the same season 
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Appendix A – Statistical Category Calculations 
 
Batters’ Regressions 
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Key Abbreviations 
 
1B=Singles 
2B=Doubles 
3B=Triples 
AB=At bats 
BB=Base on balls 
H=Hits 
HBP=Hit by pitches 
HR=Home runs 
RC=Runs created 
SF=Sacrifice flies 
SH=Sacrifice hits 
SLG=Slugging percentage 
TB=Total bases 
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Pitchers' Regression 
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Key Abbreviations 
 
BB=Base-on-Balls (or Walks) 
ER=Earned Runs 
ERA=Earned Run Average 
H=Hits Allowed 
HBP=Hit-by-Pitch 
HR=Home Runs Allowed 
IP=Innings Pitched 
K=Strikeouts 
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Appendix B – Batter Regressions 
 
 
Variable Description 
  
Age A player's age, in years. 
  
Age
2
 A player's age, in years, squared. 
  
Japan A dummy variable equal to 1 if the batter is Japanese. 
  
JapanxAge An interaction variable equal to Japan*Age 
  
ln(ABper) The natural log of a player's ratio of a player's at-bats to team at-bats. 
  
ln(salary) The natural log of a player's salary, lagged one year, converted to base year 2000 
dollars using the GDP deflator. 
  
ln(SLG) The natural log of a player's slugging percentage. 
  
RC_Bat The number of runs generated by a player, computed as (Slugging 
percentage)*(On-base percentage)*(At-bats). 
  
Runs The number of runs generated by a player, computed as 
(0.41*singles)+(.82*doubles)+(1.06*triples)+(1.42*home runs). 
  
Small A dummy variable, equal to one, if the player's team's market is in the bottom third 
of the league's team's markets. 
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Traditional Method - Batters 
 
Japanese Batters – Traditional Method 
 
. reg  lnsal lnslg lnABper age AGE2 if  Japan==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      22 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    17) =    5.16 
       Model |  13.2678572     4   3.3169643           Prob > F      =  0.0066 
    Residual |  10.9216381    17  .642449302           R-squared     =  0.5485 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4423 
       Total |  24.1894953    21  1.15188073           Root MSE      =  .80153 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnslg |   2.885037   1.707777     1.69   0.109    -.7180571    6.488131 
     lnABper |   .7449075   .3141022     2.37   0.030     .0822098    1.407605 
         age |   3.355589   1.992353     1.68   0.110    -.8479088    7.559087 
        AGE2 |  -.0533735    .030708    -1.74   0.100    -.1181616    .0114146 
       _cons |  -33.05948   32.56218    -1.02   0.324    -101.7597    35.64072 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
ln`  
 ^33.05948  2.885037 ln	  .7449075 ln  3.355589	
^ .0533735	 
 
100% Non-Japanese Batters – Traditional Method 
 
. reg  lnsal lnslg lnABper age AGE2 if  Japan==0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3061 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  3056) =  699.76 
       Model |  1809.46296     4   452.36574           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1975.56559  3056  .646454709           R-squared     =  0.4781 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4774 
       Total |  3785.02855  3060  1.23693744           Root MSE      =  .80402 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnslg |   1.474381   .0768921    19.17   0.000     1.323616    1.625147 
     lnABper |   .8940838   .0264454    33.81   0.000     .8422313    .9459362 
         age |   .3323444   .0584219     5.69   0.000     .2177943    .4468945 
        AGE2 |  -.0049254   .0009056    -5.44   0.000     -.006701   -.0031498 
       _cons |   12.77249   .9339354    13.68   0.000     10.94129     14.6037 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln`  
 12.77249  1.474381 ln	  .8940838 ln  .3323444	 ^ .0049254	 
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Pooled Batters (100% Non-Japanese) – Traditional Method 
 
. reg  lnsal lnslg lnABper age AGE2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3083 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  3078) =  703.49 
       Model |  1821.75117     4  455.437793           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1992.70236  3078  .647401678           R-squared     =  0.4776 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4769 
       Total |  3814.45354  3082  1.23765527           Root MSE      =  .80461 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnslg |   1.480376   .0767654    19.28   0.000      1.32986    1.630893 
     lnABper |   .8937928   .0263312    33.94   0.000     .8421644    .9454213 
         age |   .3391687   .0584055     5.81   0.000     .2246509    .4536864 
        AGE2 |  -.0050371   .0009053    -5.56   0.000    -.0068122    -.003262 
       _cons |   12.67581   .9337786    13.57   0.000     10.84492     14.5067 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln`  
 12.67581  1.480376 ln	  .8937928 ln  .3391687	 ^ .0050371	 
 
Chow Test – Traditional Method Entire Batter Dataset 
 
Step 1:  R: d
 , d
 , d
 , d
 , d
 ,  
  Rf: g#h$C@ @i R 
 
Step 2: d
 5% 
 
Step 3: 
 
S8,k 

1992.70236 ^ 1986.487228	/6	
1986.487228	/3071	


1.035855333
. 6468535422

 1.601375374 
 
Step 4:  Because the F statistic is less than the critical value of the F distribution FC 
(approximately 2.21) at the 5% level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, H0.  It is correct to 
assume equal coefficients. 
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Sabermetric Method – Batters 
 
Japanese Batters – Sabermetric Method 
. reg  lnsal runs age AGE2 if Japan==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      22 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,    18) =    7.64 
       Model |  13.5458167     3  4.51527224           Prob > F      =  0.0017 
    Residual |  10.6436786    18   .59131548           R-squared     =  0.5600 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4867 
       Total |  24.1894953    21  1.15188073           Root MSE      =  .76897 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        runs |   .0151046   .0050333     3.00   0.008     .0045301    .0256792 
         age |   3.857727   1.782648     2.16   0.044      .112522    7.602931 
        AGE2 |  -.0610776   .0274847    -2.22   0.039    -.1188208   -.0033345 
       _cons |  -46.79575   28.78529    -1.63   0.121    -107.2714    13.67991 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln`  
 ^46.79575  .0151046 	  3.857727	 ^ .0610776	 
100% Non-Japanese Batters – Sabermetric Method 
 
. reg  lnsal runs age AGE2 if Japan==0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3065 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,  3061) = 1266.60 
       Model |  2103.26963     3  701.089877           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1694.32415  3061  .553519814           R-squared     =  0.5538 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5534 
       Total |  3797.59378  3064  1.23942356           Root MSE      =  .74399 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        runs |   .0236116   .0003835    61.56   0.000     .0228596    .0243637 
         age |    .351889   .0540567     6.51   0.000     .2458978    .4578802 
        AGE2 |  -.0050582   .0008378    -6.04   0.000    -.0067009   -.0034156 
       _cons |   6.911381   .8687093     7.96   0.000     5.208068    8.614693 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln`  
 6.911381  .0236116 	  .351889	 ^ .351889	 
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Pooled Batters (100% Non-Japanese Batters) – Sabermetric Method 
. reg  lnsal runs age AGE2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3087 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,  3083) = 1272.22 
       Model |   2116.9966     3  705.665534           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1710.05203  3083  .554671434           R-squared     =  0.5532 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5527 
       Total |  3827.04863  3086  1.24013242           Root MSE      =  .74476 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        runs |   .0235852   .0003823    61.69   0.000     .0228355    .0243349 
         age |   .3568111   .0540565     6.60   0.000     .2508208    .4628015 
        AGE2 |  -.0051389   .0008378    -6.13   0.000    -.0067815   -.0034963 
       _cons |   6.840096   .8687111     7.87   0.000     5.136785    8.543407 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln`  
 6.840096  .0235852 	  .3568111	 ^ .0051389	 
Chow Test – Sabermetric Method Entire Batter Dataset 
 
Step 1:  R: d
 , d
 , d
 , d
  
  Rf: g#h$C@ @i R 
 
Step 2: d
 5% 
 
Step 3: 
 
S,kk 

1710.05203 ^ 1704.970518	/5	
1704.970518	/3077	


1.016302428
. 5541015658

 1.83414466 
 
Step 4:  Because the F statistic is less than the critical value of the F distribution FC 
(approximately 2.37) at the 5% level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, H0.  It is correct to 
assume equal coefficients. 
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Hyrbid Method – Batters 
 
Japanese Batters – Hybrid Method 
. reg lnsal RC_bat  Small if Japan==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      22 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,    19) =   12.78 
       Model |  13.8774581     2  6.93872906           Prob > F      =  0.0003 
    Residual |  10.3120372    19  .542738801           R-squared     =  0.5737 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5288 
       Total |  24.1894953    21  1.15188073           Root MSE      =  .73671 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      RC_bat |   .0119007   .0050486     2.36   0.029     .0013338    .0224676 
       Small |  -1.208448   .4832568    -2.50   0.022    -2.219916   -.1969797 
       _cons |   14.35573   .4480994    32.04   0.000     13.41785    15.29361 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln`  
 15.412  .046962  "#$#%	 ^ .0324151&	 
100% Non-Japanese Batters – Hybrid Method 
. reg lnsal RC_bat  Small if Japan==0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3065 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,  3062) = 1787.50 
       Model |  2045.56041     2   1022.7802           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1752.03338  3062  .572185949           R-squared     =  0.5386 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5383 
       Total |  3797.59378  3064  1.23942356           Root MSE      =  .75643 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      RC_bat |   .0221799   .0003723    59.57   0.000     .0214499      .02291 
       Small |  -.0818273   .0293428    -2.79   0.005    -.1393609   -.0242937 
       _cons |   13.18183   .0283802   464.47   0.000     13.12618    13.23747 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
ln`  
 13.18183  .0221799  "#$#%	 ^ .0818273&	 
Japanese Players in Major League Baseball:  An Econometric Analysis of Labor 
Discrimination 
Senior Capstone Project for Kyle Audet 
87 
 
Pooled Batters (100% Non-Japanese) – Hybrid Method 
. reg lnsal RC_bat  Small 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3087 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  2,  3084) = 1798.02 
       Model |  2060.19977     2  1030.09988           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1766.84887  3084  .572908193           R-squared     =  0.5383 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5380 
       Total |  3827.04863  3086  1.24013242           Root MSE      =  .75691 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      RC_bat |    .022163   .0003711    59.72   0.000     .0214353    .0228907 
       Small |  -.0858057   .0292848    -2.93   0.003    -.1432253   -.0283861 
       _cons |   13.18573   .0283367   465.32   0.000     13.13017    13.24129 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln`  
 13.18573  .022163  "#$#%	 ^ .0858057&	 
 
Chow Test – Hybrid Method Entire Batter Dataset 
Step 1:  R: d
 , d
 , d
  
  Rf: g#h$C@ @i R 
 
Step 2: d
 5% 
 
Step 3: 
 
S,km 

1766.84887 ^ 1762.345417	/4	
1762.345417	/3079	


1.12586325
. 5723759068

 1.966999723 
 
Step 4:  Because the F statistic is less than the critical value of the F distribution FC 
(approximately 2.60) at the 5% level, we fail to reject the null hypothesis, H0.  It is correct to 
assume equal coefficients. 
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Oaxaca Decomposition – Batters 
 
Sabermetric Specification 
 
ln	 
    	  	  
   
 
. oaxaca nonJapan Japan; 
(high estimates: Japan; low estimates: nonJapan) 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.99823 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.50865 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .4895785   .2527598     1.94   0.053    -.0058216    .9849787 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decomposition 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
three-fold   | 
  endowments |   .2298492   .1212733     1.90   0.058     -.007842    .4675405 
coefficients |   -.017054   .2557174    -0.07   0.947    -.5182509    .4841428 
 interaction |   .2767834   .2278557     1.21   0.224    -.1698056    .7233723 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. oaxaca nonJapan Japan, weight(1 0.5 0 omega); 
(high estimates: Japan; low estimates: nonJapan) 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.99823 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.50865 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .4895785   .2527598     1.94   0.053    -.0058216    .9849787 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decompositions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=1          | 
   explained |   .5066326   .2656083     1.91   0.056      -.01395    1.027215 
 unexplained |   -.017054   .2557174    -0.07   0.947    -.5182509    .4841428 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=,5         | 
   explained |   .3682409   .1721857     2.14   0.032     .0307631    .7057187 
 unexplained |   .1213376   .2058956     0.59   0.556    -.2822103    .5248855 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=0          | 
   explained |   .2298492   .1212733     1.90   0.058     -.007842    .4675405 
 unexplained |   .2597293   .2129641     1.22   0.223    -.1576727    .6771313 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=omega      | 
   explained |   .2305448   .1213653     1.90   0.057    -.0073269    .4684164 
 unexplained |   .2590338   .2124685     1.22   0.223    -.1573969    .6754644 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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. oaxaca2 lnsal lnslg lnABper age AGE2, by(Japan) pooled; 
 
Group 1: Japan = 0                               Number of obs 1   =      3061 
Group 2: Japan = 1                               Number of obs 2   =        22 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.50865 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.99823 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |  -.4895785   .2527598    -1.94   0.053    -.9849787    .0058216 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decomposition 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
pooled       | 
   explained |  -.2305448   .1213658    -1.90   0.057    -.4684173    .0073278 
 unexplained |  -.2590338          .        .       .            .           . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix C – Pitchers Regressions 
 
 
Variable Description 
  
Age A player's age, in years. 
  
Age
2
 A player's age, in years, squared. 
  
Japan A dummy variable equal to 1 if the batter is Japanese. 
  
JapanxAge An interaction variable equal to Japan*Age 
  
ln(salary) The natural log of a player's salary, lagged one year, 
converted to base year 2000 dollars using the GDP 
deflator. 
  
lnIP The natural log of a player's total innings-pitched. 
  
lnSW The natural log of a player's strikeout to walk ratio. 
  
Small A dummy variable, equal to one, if the player's team is in 
the bottom third of the league teams’ market sizes. 
  
SV_pitch A player's total number of saves in a season. 
  
W_pitch A player's total number of wins in a season. 
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Traditional Method – Pitchers 
 
Japanese Pitchers 
. reg  lnsal lnSW lnIP AGE AGE2 if Japan==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,    39) =    5.74 
       Model |  15.4227371     4  3.85568428           Prob > F      =  0.0010 
    Residual |  26.1989891    39  .671768951           R-squared     =  0.3705 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3060 
       Total |  41.6217262    43  .967947121           Root MSE      =  .81962 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnSW |   .3420868   .3488879     0.98   0.333    -.3636056    1.047779 
        lnIP |     .43097   .2503918     1.72   0.093    -.0754953    .9374353 
         AGE |   1.847313   .7180596     2.57   0.014     .3949007    3.299726 
        AGE2 |  -.0275738   .0117604    -2.34   0.024    -.0513613   -.0037862 
       _cons |  -18.49154    10.8473    -1.70   0.096    -40.43228      3.4492 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln	 
 ^18.49154  .3420868 lnSW	  .43097 lnIP	  1.847313AGE	
^ .0285738AGE	 
Non-Japanese Pitchers 
. reg  lnsal lnSW lnIP AGE AGE2 if Japan==0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2471 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  2466) =  370.01 
       Model |  1015.53816     4  253.884539           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1692.04845  2466  .686151033           R-squared     =  0.3751 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3741 
       Total |   2707.5866  2470  1.09618891           Root MSE      =  .82834 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnSW |   .6271473   .0413619    15.16   0.000     .5460395     .708255 
        lnIP |   .9138889   .0300134    30.45   0.000     .8550348     .972743 
         AGE |   .4754024   .0574072     8.28   0.000     .3628311    .5879736 
        AGE2 |  -.0065061   .0008938    -7.28   0.000    -.0082587   -.0047535 
       _cons |   1.322308   .9364749     1.41   0.158    -.5140503    3.158667 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln	 

1.322308  .6271473 lnSW	  .9138889 lnIP	  .4754024AGE	 ^ .0065061AGE	 
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All Pitchers 
. reg  lnsal lnSW lnIP AGE AGE2 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  2510) =  370.01 
       Model |  1019.89291     4  254.973228           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1729.6564  2510  .689106137           R-squared     =  0.3709 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3699 
       Total |  2749.54932  2514  1.09369503           Root MSE      =  .83012 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnSW |   .6301392   .0410637    15.35   0.000      .549617    .7106614 
        lnIP |   .9043861   .0297864    30.36   0.000     .8459777    .9627945 
         AGE |   .4886703   .0571649     8.55   0.000     .3765752    .6007655 
        AGE2 |   -.006697   .0008905    -7.52   0.000    -.0084431   -.0049509 
       _cons |   1.135362   .9321406     1.22   0.223    -.6924809    2.963206 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln	 
 1.135362  .6301392 lnSW	  .9043861 lnIP	  .4886703AGE	
^ .006697AGE	 
 
Chow Test 
Step 1:  R: d
 , d
 , d
 , d
 , d
  
  Rf: g#h$C@ @i R 
 
Step 2: d
 5% 
 
Step 3: 
 
S,nk 

1729.6564 ^ 1718.247439	/6	
1718.247439	/2503	


1.9014935
. 6864752054

 2.769937625 
 
Step 4:  Because the F statistic is greater than the critical value of the F distribution FC 
(approximately 2.21) at the 5% level, we reject the null hypothesis, H0.  It is incorrect to 
assume equal coefficients. 
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Hybrid Method – Pitchers 
 
Japanese Pitchers 
. reg lnsal  W_pitch  SV_pitch AGE AGE2 Small if Japan==1 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      44 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    38) =    9.77 
       Model |  23.4131683     5  4.68263366           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  18.2085579    38  .479172576           R-squared     =  0.5625 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5050 
       Total |  41.6217262    43  .967947121           Root MSE      =  .69222 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     W_pitch |   .0700887   .0251923     2.78   0.008     .0190896    .1210878 
    SV_pitch |   .0267386   .0110037     2.43   0.020     .0044628    .0490145 
         AGE |   1.923978   .6097785     3.16   0.003     .6895456     3.15841 
        AGE2 |   -.029257   .0099627    -2.94   0.006    -.0494254   -.0090885 
       Small |  -.8500109   .3476231    -2.45   0.019    -1.553737   -.1462848 
       _cons |  -17.50737   9.220435    -1.90   0.065    -36.17316    1.158424 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln	 
 ^17.50737  .0700887Wins	  .0267386Saves	  1.923978AGE	
^ .029257AGE	 ^ .8500109&	 
 
Non-Japanese Pitchers 
. reg lnsal  W_pitch  SV_pitch AGE AGE2 Small if Japan==0 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2471 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  2465) =  388.54 
       Model |  1193.37355     5   238.67471           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1514.21305  2465  .614285214           R-squared     =  0.4408 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4396 
       Total |   2707.5866  2470  1.09618891           Root MSE      =  .78376 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     W_pitch |   .1330055   .0033073    40.22   0.000     .1265201    .1394909 
    SV_pitch |   .0325574   .0015798    20.61   0.000     .0294595    .0356553 
         AGE |   .4298984   .0542982     7.92   0.000     .3234236    .5363731 
        AGE2 |  -.0059235   .0008456    -7.00   0.000    -.0075817   -.0042653 
       Small |   -.157071   .0339003    -4.63   0.000    -.2235471   -.0905949 
       _cons |   5.811774   .8647519     6.72   0.000     4.116059    7.507489 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln	 
 5.811774  .1330055Wins	  .0325574Saves	  .4298984AGE	 ^
.0059235AGE	 ^ .157071&	  
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All Pitchers 
. reg lnsal  W_pitch  SV_pitch AGE AGE2 Small 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  2509) =  392.76 
       Model |  1207.20137     5  241.440274           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1542.34795  2509  .614726165           R-squared     =  0.4391 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4379 
       Total |  2749.54932  2514  1.09369503           Root MSE      =  .78404 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     W_pitch |   .1322973   .0032844    40.28   0.000     .1258569    .1387378 
    SV_pitch |   .0326926   .0015657    20.88   0.000     .0296224    .0357627 
         AGE |   .4378198   .0539679     8.11   0.000     .3319936    .5436459 
        AGE2 |  -.0060367   .0008409    -7.18   0.000    -.0076857   -.0043877 
       Small |  -.1565574   .0337087    -4.64   0.000    -.2226571   -.0904577 
       _cons |   5.677091   .8590604     6.61   0.000     3.992551    7.361631 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
ln	 
 5.677091  .1322973Wins	  .0326926Saves	  .4378198AGE	
^ .0060367AGE	 ^ .1565574&	 
 
 
Chow Test 
Step 1:  R: d
 , d
 , d
 , d
 , d
 , d8
 8 
  Rf: g#h$C@ @i R 
 
Step 2: d
 5% 
 
Step 3: 
 
S,nk 

1542.34795 ^ 1532.421608	/7	
1532.421608	/2489	


1.418048857
. 6156776247

 2.303232731 
 
Step 4:  Because the F statistic is greater than the critical value of the F distribution FC 
(approximately 2.10) at the 5% level, we reject the null hypothesis, H0.  It is incorrect to 
assume equal coefficients. 
  
Japanese Players in Major League Baseball:  An Econometric Analysis of Labor 
Discrimination 
Senior Capstone Project for Kyle Audet 
95 
 
Oaxaca Decomposition – Pitchers 
 
Tradiitonal Specification 
ln	 
 0  1 lnSW	  2 lnIP	  3AGE	  4AGE
	   
. oaxaca nonJapan Japan; 
(high estimates: nonJapan; low estimates: Japan) 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.38429 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.29548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .0888126   .1590087     0.56   0.576    -.2228388     .400464 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decomposition 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
three-fold   | 
  endowments |  -.1998524   .1158087    -1.73   0.084    -.4268334    .0271285 
coefficients |   .2151689   .1485963     1.45   0.148    -.0760745    .5064123 
 interaction |   .0734961   .1015974     0.72   0.469    -.1256312    .2726234 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. oaxaca nonJapan Japan, weight(1 0.5 0 omega); 
(high estimates: nonJapan; low estimates: Japan) 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.38429 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.29548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .0888126   .1590087     0.56   0.576    -.2228388     .400464 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decompositions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=1          | 
   explained |  -.1263563   .0748764    -1.69   0.092    -.2731115    .0203988 
 unexplained |   .2151689   .1485963     1.45   0.148    -.0760745    .5064123 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=,5         | 
   explained |  -.1631044    .083238    -1.96   0.050    -.3262478    .0000391 
 unexplained |   .2519169   .1346316     1.87   0.061    -.0119561      .51579 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=0          | 
   explained |  -.1998524   .1158087    -1.73   0.084    -.4268334    .0271285 
 unexplained |    .288665   .1390377     2.08   0.038     .0161561    .5611739 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=omega      | 
   explained |  -.1266728   .0745641    -1.70   0.089    -.2728158    .0194702 
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 unexplained |   .2154854    .147636     1.46   0.144    -.0738758    .5048467 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. oaxaca2 lnsal lnSW lnIP AGE AGE2, by(Japan) pooled; 
 
Group 1: Japan = 0                               Number of obs 1   =      2471 
Group 2: Japan = 1                               Number of obs 2   =        44 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.38429 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.29548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .0888126   .1590087     0.56   0.576    -.2228388     .400464 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decomposition 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
pooled       | 
   explained |  -.1266728   .0745658    -1.70   0.089    -.2728192    .0194735 
 unexplained |   .2154854          .        .       .            .           . 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Hybrid Specification 
ln	 
   Wins	  Saves	  AGE	  AGE	  8&	   
oaxaca nonJapan Japan; 
(high estimates: nonJapan; low estimates: Japan) 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.38429 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.29548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .0888126   .1580381     0.56   0.574    -.2209365    .3985616 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decomposition 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
three-fold   | 
  endowments |  -.3836826   .1503578    -2.55   0.011    -.6783785   -.0889868 
coefficients |   .2272539   .1288806     1.76   0.078    -.0253476    .4798553 
 interaction |   .2452413   .1197272     2.05   0.041     .0105803    .4799024 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. oaxaca nonJapan Japan, weight(1 0.5 0 omega); 
(high estimates: nonJapan; low estimates: Japan) 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.38429 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.29548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .0888126   .1580381     0.56   0.574    -.2209365    .3985616 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decompositions 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=1          | 
   explained |  -.1384413   .1002681    -1.38   0.167    -.3349631    .0580805 
 unexplained |   .2272539   .1288806     1.76   0.078    -.0253476    .4798553 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=,5         | 
   explained |   -.261062   .1129023    -2.31   0.021    -.4823464   -.0397776 
 unexplained |   .3498745   .1213365     2.88   0.004     .1120594    .5876896 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=0          | 
   explained |  -.3836826   .1503578    -2.55   0.011    -.6783785   -.0889868 
 unexplained |   .4724952    .141429     3.34   0.001     .1952995    .7496909 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
W=omega      | 
   explained |  -.1388299   .1001779    -1.39   0.166     -.335175    .0575152 
 unexplained |   .2276425   .1279548     1.78   0.075    -.0231442    .4784292 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. oaxaca2 lnsal W_pitch  SV_pitch AGE AGE2 Small, by(Japan) pooled; 
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Group 1: Japan = 0                               Number of obs 1   =      2471 
Group 2: Japan = 1                               Number of obs 2   =        44 
 
                                                 Mean prediction 1 =  14.38429 
                                                 Mean prediction 2 =  14.29548 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
  difference |   .0888126   .1580381     0.56   0.574    -.2209365    .3985616 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Linear decomposition 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       Total |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
pooled       | 
   explained |  -.1388299   .1001798    -1.39   0.166    -.3351787    .0575188 
 unexplained |   .2276425          .        .       .            .           . 
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Appendix D - Evaluating Average Difference in Salary Level 
Batters 
 
Traditional Method Specification – Batters 
 
. reg  lnsal lnslg lnABper age AGE2 Japan 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3083 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  3077) =  563.47 
       Model |  1823.21938     5  364.643876           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1991.23416  3077  .647134923           R-squared     =  0.4780 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4771 
       Total |  3814.45354  3082  1.23765527           Root MSE      =  .80445 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnslg |   1.481094   .0767511    19.30   0.000     1.330605    1.631583 
     lnABper |   .8927026   .0263357    33.90   0.000     .8410653      .94434 
         age |   .3363722    .058423     5.76   0.000     .2218202    .4509242 
        AGE2 |  -.0049939   .0009056    -5.51   0.000    -.0067695   -.0032183 
       Japan |   .2594886   .1722749     1.51   0.132     -.078297    .5972742 
       _cons |   12.71623   .9339718    13.62   0.000     10.88496     14.5475 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Sabermetic Method Specification - Batters 
 
 
. reg  lnsal  runs  age AGE2 Japan 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3087 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  3082) =  954.35 
       Model |  2117.48745     4  529.371862           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1709.56119  3082  .554692143           R-squared     =  0.5533 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5527 
       Total |  3827.04863  3086  1.24013242           Root MSE      =  .74478 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        runs |   .0235732   .0003826    61.62   0.000     .0228231    .0243233 
         age |   .3551582    .054086     6.57   0.000     .2491099    .4612066 
        AGE2 |  -.0051134   .0008382    -6.10   0.000    -.0067569   -.0034699 
       Japan |   .1500573   .1595186     0.94   0.347    -.1627162    .4628309 
       _cons |   6.866354   .8691756     7.90   0.000     5.162132    8.570577 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Hybrid Method Specification – Batters 
 
 
. reg lnslg RC Small Japan 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3083 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,  3079) = 1163.71 
       Model |  76.3732192     3  25.4577397           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   67.357521  3079  .021876428           R-squared     =  0.5314 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5309 
       Total |   143.73074  3082  .046635542           Root MSE      =  .14791 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnslg |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      RC_bat |   .0042926   .0000727    59.06   0.000     .0041501    .0044351 
       Small |   .0052367   .0057262     0.91   0.361     -.005991    .0164643 
       Japan |  -.0316807   .0316667    -1.00   0.317    -.0937708    .0304094 
       _cons |  -1.127553   .0055551  -202.98   0.000    -1.138445   -1.116661 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Pitchers 
 
Traditional Method Specification – Batters 
 
. reg lnsal lnSW lnIP AGE AGE2 Japan 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  2509) =  296.82 
       Model |   1021.9045     5    204.3809           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1727.64482  2509  .688579042           R-squared     =  0.3717 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3704 
       Total |  2749.54932  2514  1.09369503           Root MSE      =  .82981 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnSW |   .6298058   .0410485    15.34   0.000     .5493134    .7102981 
        lnIP |   .9057056    .029785    30.41   0.000     .8472999    .9641114 
         AGE |   .4925648   .0571884     8.61   0.000     .3804235    .6047062 
        AGE2 |  -.0067567   .0008908    -7.58   0.000    -.0085035   -.0050099 
       Japan |  -.2159403   .1263401    -1.71   0.088    -.4636818    .0318012 
       _cons |   1.070845   .9325483     1.15   0.251    -.7577984    2.899488 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Hybrid Method Specification – Batters 
 
 
. reg lnsal W_pitch SV_pitch AGE AGE2 Small Japan 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,  2508) =  328.26 
       Model |  1209.45345     6  201.575575           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1540.09587  2508  .614073313           R-squared     =  0.4399 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4385 
       Total |  2749.54932  2514  1.09369503           Root MSE      =  .78363 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     W_pitch |   .1323636   .0032829    40.32   0.000     .1259262     .138801 
    SV_pitch |   .0327139   .0015649    20.90   0.000     .0296453    .0357825 
         AGE |    .441934    .053982     8.19   0.000     .3360802    .5477879 
        AGE2 |  -.0061009   .0008412    -7.25   0.000    -.0077504   -.0044515 
       Small |  -.1604358   .0337516    -4.75   0.000    -.2266197   -.0942519 
       Japan |  -.2288458   .1194982    -1.92   0.056     -.463171    .0054794 
       _cons |   5.616929   .8591786     6.54   0.000     3.932157    7.301702 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix E - Evaluating Returns to Age 
 
Batters 
 
Traditional Method Specification 
. reg  lnsal lnslg lnABper age AGE2 JapanxAGE 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3083 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  3077) =  563.35 
       Model |  1823.00584     5  364.601168           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1991.4477  3077  .647204322           R-squared     =  0.4779 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4771 
       Total |  3814.45354  3082  1.23765527           Root MSE      =  .80449 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       lnslg |   1.480923   .0767547    19.29   0.000     1.330428    1.631419 
     lnABper |   .8928816   .0263353    33.90   0.000     .8412451    .9445182 
         age |     .33661   .0584255     5.76   0.000      .222053    .4511669 
        AGE2 |   -.004998   .0009056    -5.52   0.000    -.0067736   -.0032223 
   JapanxAGE |   .0076373   .0054852     1.39   0.164    -.0031178    .0183923 
       _cons |   12.71332   .9340248    13.61   0.000     10.88194    14.54469 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Sabermetric Method Specification 
 
. reg lnsal  runs age AGE2  JapanxAGE 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3087 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  4,  3082) =  954.28 
       Model |  2117.41273     4  529.353183           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1709.6359  3082  .554716386           R-squared     =  0.5533 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5527 
       Total |  3827.04863  3086  1.24013242           Root MSE      =  .74479 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        runs |    .023575   .0003825    61.63   0.000     .0228249    .0243251 
         age |   .3553071   .0540866     6.57   0.000     .2492578    .4613565 
        AGE2 |  -.0051159   .0008382    -6.10   0.000    -.0067594   -.0034724 
   JapanxAGE |   .0043989   .0050788     0.87   0.386    -.0055594    .0143572 
       _cons |   6.864153   .8691902     7.90   0.000     5.159902    8.568404 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Hybrid Method Specification 
 
. reg lnsal RC Small JapanxAGE 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    3087 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  3,  3083) = 1199.57 
       Model |  2061.21583     3  687.071945           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   1765.8328  3083   .57276445           R-squared     =  0.5386 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5381 
       Total |  3827.04863  3086  1.24013242           Root MSE      =  .75681 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
      RC_bat |   .0221517   .0003712    59.68   0.000     .0214239    .0228795 
       Small |  -.0850534   .0292865    -2.90   0.004    -.1424765   -.0276303 
   JapanxAGE |   .0068705   .0051584     1.33   0.183    -.0032437    .0169847 
       _cons |   13.18464   .0283449   465.15   0.000     13.12906    13.24022 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Pitchers 
 
Traditional Method Specification 
 
 
. reg lnsal lnSW lnIP AGE AGE2 JapanxAGE 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,  2509) =  296.54 
       Model |  1021.29867     5  204.259733           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1728.25065  2509  .688820506           R-squared     =  0.3714 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.3702 
       Total |  2749.54932  2514  1.09369503           Root MSE      =  .82995 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
        lnSW |   .6298631   .0410557    15.34   0.000     .5493566    .7103695 
        lnIP |   .9053865   .0297885    30.39   0.000      .846974     .963799 
         AGE |     .49249   .0572155     8.61   0.000     .3802955    .6046845 
        AGE2 |  -.0067547   .0008912    -7.58   0.000    -.0085023   -.0050072 
   JapanxAGE |  -.0057914    .004054    -1.43   0.153    -.0137409    .0021581 
       _cons |   1.072015   .9330017     1.15   0.251    -.7575174    2.901547 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Hybrid Method Specification 
 
 
. reg lnsal W_pitch SV_pitch AGE AGE2 Small JapanxAGE 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =    2515 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,  2508) =  328.06 
       Model |   1209.0402     6    201.5067           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1540.50912  2508  .614238084           R-squared     =  0.4397 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4384 
       Total |  2749.54932  2514  1.09369503           Root MSE      =  .78373 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       lnsal |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     W_pitch |   .1323587   .0032833    40.31   0.000     .1259204     .138797 
    SV_pitch |   .0327212   .0015651    20.91   0.000     .0296521    .0357903 
         AGE |   .4421845   .0540054     8.19   0.000     .3362848    .5480843 
        AGE2 |  -.0061037   .0008415    -7.25   0.000    -.0077538   -.0044536 
       Small |  -.1599309   .0337517    -4.74   0.000    -.2261149   -.0937469 
   JapanxAGE |  -.0066338   .0038341    -1.73   0.084    -.0141521    .0008845 
       _cons |   5.611269   .8595615     6.53   0.000     3.925746    7.296792 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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